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ABSTRACT
Applying the Christian principles of depraved human 
nature, expectation of detrimental behavior from irrational 
actors, and rational attempts to limit the destructiveness of 
war, Augustine would conclude that the declared nuclear 
weapons states have a moral obligation to prevent proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. Laws suitable to the needs of the times 
are the appropriate method for accomplishing this. The 
pending Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one such 
law. Because the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions and 
establishes an intrusive inspection scheme, it will have an 
impact on the U. S. Department of Energy (DoE). DoE should 
respond by participating in the new inspection organization, by 
interpreting findings resulting from inspections, and by 
continuing management of the Nevada Test Site. The CTBT may 
be efficacious in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation in 
the short term. Considering a longer-term perspective, a 
frightening prospect emerges as a result of an Augustinian 
assessment of human nature.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Saint Augustine was a realist. Born in 354 to a pagan 
Roman father and a Christian mother, he lived a normal 
childhood. Questioning the usefulness of learning, he resisted 
education and participated in childish pranks, petty thefts and 
prideful display. That changed in late adolescence, however, 
when he began a patently dissolute lifestyle and read Cicero’s 
Hortenslus in 375.
Reading Cicero imbued in Augustine a lifelong interest in 
philosophy. As a result, four rather distinct periods are 
apparent in Augustine’s life and writings. First, as a young 
man, Augustine was interested in Manicheeism. Mani, a 
Persian, in practical terms had claimed to be divine and had set 
forth philosophical propositions which held that good and evil 
were co-equal moral entities. Most of Manicheeism’s content 
was irrational, in Augustine’s view, and this eventually led to 
his abandoning it in favor of Platonism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
As a Platonist, Augustine in his second period was 
heavily influenced by the writings of Plotinus. For example, 
according to Karl Jaspers (197), the Platonic view of God is one 
of the unity of the good, the true and the beautiful. God in this 
view represents or is equivalent to the eternal world of ideas, 
the “cosmos of becoming,” in Jaspers’ terminology. Plotinus, 
according to Jaspers, tended to the Platonic view of ideas as an 
independent realm. In C o n fessio n s 7:9, Augustine himself 
describes the Platonic view that God is powerful and desirable, 
as advanced by Plotinus.
Augustine converted to Christianity in 387. In S t. 
Augustine’s Early Theory of Man. Robert J. O’Connell describes 
Augustine’s early post-conversion writings. These writings 
include Against the Academics. S o liloqu ies. On Order. On the 
Immortality of the Soul, and are examples of his third period of 
intellectual activity. In the writings of this period, Augustine 
attempts to meld the Platonic and Plotinistic philosophies with 
the Christianity which was fresh and vibrant in his mind.
Augustine was ordained a priest in 391, and later Bishop 
of Hippo. This began the fourth period of his intellectual life, 
that of the mature writings. In this final and most productive 
period, Augustine produced the C onfessions, the Ci tv of God. 
and On Free Choice of the Will as well as a vast body of other 
writings and sermons. In this period, which lasted to his death
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in 430, Augustine is concerned not with philosophy, but with a 
form of philosophical theology. His emphasis is not to reconcile 
secular philosophy and Christianity, but rather with questions 
of right and wrong, with salvation, and with the impact of 
C hristianity  upon politics, ethics and practical affairs. 
Augustine’s conception of God is quite different from that of his 
Platonic period. In this fourth period he conceives of God in a 
Judean rather than Greek sense as a triune being, the source of 
all ideas. Augustine comes to understand that the Platonic 
position cannot see a need for sacrifice and humility on the 
part of the religious believer (Rist 3). It is significant that early 
in this fourth period Augustine produced the C o n fe s s io n s . 
which, in large measure, quotes Scripture rather than secular 
philosophers to advance his arguments (Rist 15). Describing his 
break with the Platonists in Confessions 7:21, Augustine writes, 
“Their pages have not the mien of the true love of God.” This 
study concentrates on Augustine’s mature writings because of 
their applicability to modern political and ethical conditions.
The world-historical setting of Augustine’s lifetime was 
distressing. The Roman Empire was clearly in decline. 
Continuous warfare along the Rhine took an ever-increasing toll 
of Roman strength in manpower and finance. In 410, Germanic 
bands under Alaric entered and sacked Rome. This was the 
occasion of Augustine’s writing Ci tv of God, which attempted to 
show that the enfeeblement of Roman power was not a result 
of an abandonment of the classical pagan deities, as some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
claimed, but of a glaring lack of regard for simple moral values. 
Christianity could restore Roman virtue, Augustine claimed.
Disintegration of the Roman system continued apace. 
This caused Augustine much distress. The loss of social order 
imposed as part of the Roman system  would lead in 
A ugustine’s view to much unhappiness and to many 
philosophical problems. Thus Augustine was led to consider 
political, ethical and military topics from his Christian 
perspective. These are set forth in City of God. E nchirid ion . 
A gainst Faustus. and in other writings. Given Augustine’s fine 
and logical intellect and the circumstances of his world, it is not 
surprising that hé sought to explain the human condition and 
human behavior as it actually is, rather than as one might wish 
it to be. “Whatever else Augustine may be,” John H. Randall 
writes in Hellenistic Wavs of Deliverance and the Making of the 
Christian Synthesis, “he is surely what we like today to call a 
realist, with just that salutary freedom from sentimentality 
that suits the temper of the times” (193). This is the essence of 
the realist position.
POLITICAL REALISM
The Augustinian view of intrinsic human depravity leads 
directly to modern Realistic political theories. All Realist 
theories depend upon the observational method (Morgenthau
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4). That which is observed concerning human behavior and 
concerning the behavior of states in the international arena is 
the basis of Realism. Thus Realism holds that international 
political affairs are governed by principles which have their 
origin in human nature displayed as observed actual behaviors 
rather than as behaviors which one might otherwise desire. 
Thus, in all Realist theories, the world of human endeavor, and 
the practice of international politics in that world, is necessarily 
imperfect from a purely rational perspective. Realism holds 
that moral principles can never be realized, but can only be 
approached and approximated. Realism attempts to gain the 
lesser evil in its approach, rather than an absolute good.
There are three fundamental principles common to all 
varieties of Realist theory. These principles provide an 
intellectual framework by which the student of international 
affairs may interpret events and evaluate situations. The firs t 
principle is the state-centric principle. This holds that the most 
important actors in international relations are national entities 
organized throughout a particular region or territory. In 
ancient times, such political entities were city-states; in more 
recent years, they are nation-states.
The s e c o n d  fundamental principle is that, on the 
international level, state behavior can be explained in rational 
terms. John W. Kingdon has developed a model of internal 
national decision-making wherein dom estic policy is not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
invariably made in a rational fashion. By contrast, concerning 
the international arena, John C. Harsanyi points out that there 
are “few areas of social behavior where rational calculation 
plays a more important part than it does in international
politics.” A mistake has serious consequences. Therefore, most
foreign policy decisions are the result of careful analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages expected to resu lt from 
alternative policies. In many situations, the assumption of 
rational behavior or significant elements of rational behavior is 
a valid simplifying assumption which permits analysis.
The th ird  fundamental principle is that states seek power 
and determine their interests in terms of power. Power in this 
context means the ability of one nation to influence or to some 
extent determine the actions or behavior of other nations. 
Nations seek power for its own sake or for the purpose of
achieving other goals.
Hans J. Morgenthau, for many years a faculty member 
and dean at the University of Chicago, set forth the tenets of 
classical Realism in his 1948 book, republished in 1966, Politics 
Among N ations. More recently, Kenneth N. Waltz describes 
Morgenthau's Realism as “reductionistic” because it holds that 
individual nation-states are the primary actors in international 
affairs, rather than some supra-national actor.
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Concerning classical R ealistic  theory, Morgenthau 
describes six specific tenets which extend the basic principles 
set forth above. First. Realism holds that human nature has not 
changed in millennia and in fact cannot be changed. This 
unflattering, Augustinian claim is the central tenet of classical 
Realism and indeed of all Realistic theories. “In order to 
improve society,” Morgenthau asserts, “it is first necessary to
understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of
these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will 
ehallenge them only at the risk of failure” (4) Realism holds 
that its view of human nature is based on objective observation 
and that a credible rational theory must be based on these 
observations. Only then can a rational theory be developed 
which reflects the facts and provides
the possibility in politics of distinguishing between 
. . . what is true objectively and rationally, 
supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, 
and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced 
from the facts as they are and informed by 
prejudice and wishful thinking. (4)
Morgenthau asserts that the facts of human nature and 
concomitant behavior were known thousands of years ago. 
Because the basic facts remain unchanged, to reject them is not
rational. Such a rejection is an assumption that in political
affairs there are “opinions but no truths” (5).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8M orgenthau’s Realistic theory contains the unstated 
assumptions that an aspect of human nature is to act according 
to one’s interest, and that this nature ultimately drives national 
behavior. According to Morgenthau, therefore, the se co n d  
tenet in Realism is interest, defined in terms of power. Nations 
tend to behave according to their interest, rather than 
according to any other factor. This concept enables the scholar 
of international politics to understand the actions of nations 
and of statesmen by understanding the basic motivations of 
their respective practices. The disinterested scholar may thus 
understand the thoughts and actions of each political actor and 
make predictions based on assumptions of rational behavior 
within the limitations imposed by the nature of political 
science.
This concept of interest defined by power “imposes 
intellectual discipline upon the observer.” It “infuses rational 
order” into what is otherwise a rather disorganized and chaotic 
subject, in M orgenthau’s view. Given this intellectual 
d iscip line, M orgenthau discovers in most nations an 
“astounding continuity in foreign policy” which responds only 
in small degree to successive leaders possessing diverse moral 
qualities, motives and intellects (6).
Third, interest can be described in a political and cultural 
context. Morgenthau asserts that there is no fixed, universal 
definition of interest. Archie Bahm was for many years full
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professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico. In his 
book What Makes Acts Right?. Bahm points out that “all words 
are more or less ambiguous” (56). This is particularly true for
the word “interest.” However, in the present context national
interest consists largely of internal security and security 
against armed attack from external sources, access to raw 
materials, minerals and petroleum, and access to international
markets. Most nations regard an attempt to compromise any of 
these interests as an act of war.
The basic idea of interest, according to Morgenthau, is
indeed rather fixed. The details vary with time and place. It is 
the essence of all politics for nations, subnational groups and 
individuals to pursue their respective interests. Indeed, 
nations and subnational groups are aggregations of those of 
similar interest. In Politics Among Nations. Morgenthau quotes 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponesian W ar: “identity of 
interest is the surest of bonds whether between states or 
individuals” (8). Morgenthau also goes on to quote George 
W ashington’s remarks regarding interest as a principle of 
governm ent.
A small knowledge of human nature will convince 
us that, with far the greatest part of mankind, 
interest is the governing principle; and that almost 
every man is more or less, under its influence. 
Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in 
particular instances, actuate men to the observance 
of a conduct purely disinterested, but they are not 
of themselves sufficient to produce a persevering
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of 
social duty. Few men are capable of making a 
continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or 
advantage, to the common good. It is vain to 
exclaim against the depravity of human nature on 
this account; the fact is so, the experience of every 
age and nation has proved it and we must in a great 
measure, change the constitution of man, before we 
can make it otherwise. No institution not built on 
the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed. 
( 8)
The kind of interest which determines political action in 
concrete circumstances depends on the “political and cultural 
context” (9) in which foreign policy is created. For example, 
Japanese naval behavior on 07 December 1941 was based on 
conceptions alien to those typical of the Occidental mind. 
Interests based on notions of honor and of ojl, or obligation, 
steadily dwindling oil stocks, a deteriorating wartime situation 
in China, as well as a nearly desperate international situation, 
were the factors uppermost in the minds of Japanese leaders. 
Thus the Japanese were behaving according to their own 
concept of interest, defined by power.
The concept of power, according to Morgenthau, varies 
according to time and circumstance. Power is anything that 
“establishes and maintains the control of man over man” (9). It 
consists of a spectrum of means ranging from immediate 
physical violence to psychological manipulation and appeal to 
moral obligations. The nature of power and the manner in 
which it is used is a reflection of the political and cultural
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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environment. The nature of power being exercised in the 
international environment, say, on 15 December 1941, was 
rather different from the nuclear standoff during the Cold War. 
Both are different yet from the largely economic power being 
exercised in the present world system.
Fourth , international realism acknowledges the moral and 
ethical significance of political action. As Rosemarie Tong has 
pointed out, there is a tension between moral obligation and 
the imperatives of successful political action (62). Realism 
recognizes this and is not willing either to ignore the often 
brutal facts of international relations or to make moral tenets 
of no effect.
M orgenthau’s Realism maintains that moral principles 
cannot be applied in the international arena as abstract 
principles of universal applicability. Such high values must be 
interpreted in actual circumstances. A natural person may 
claim as a principle, “Let justice be done, even if the world 
perish.” Such a person may choose to give up life itself rather 
than to compromise his cherished beliefs. Such an attitude 
cannot apply to governments. In Rom ans 13:4, Paul proclaims 
that a magistrate is a “minister . . .  to thee for good,” that is, to 
the individual. A minister or an administration cannot be a 
principal, but must be an agent. A national state, being an 
agent rather than a principal, has no right to claim that moral 
principle in the name of those in its care. The state has no
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right to permit moral scruples to interfere with successful 
political action intended to result in national survival, which is 
itself a high moral principle. Alfred Thayer Mahan was 
President of the Naval War College when he wrote The Problem 
of Asia and the Effect upon International P o litics. Therein he 
a sserted
It is vain to expect governments to act continuously 
on any other ground than national interest. They 
have no right to do so, being agents and not 
principals. (187)
More recently George F. Kennan has expressed himself 
regarding the same thought.
The principles of a government are not entirely the 
same as those of an individual. The individual, in 
choosing his principles, engages only himself. He is 
at liberty to sacrifice his own practical interests in 
the service of some higher and more unselfish ideal.
But this sort of sacrifice is one that a responsible 
governm ent, and a dem ocratic government in 
particular, is unable to take upon itself. It is an 
agent, not a principal. It is only a representative of 
others. (120)
Thus the behavior of governments everywhere reflects the 
nature of the persons therein, but the governments themselves 
do not follow exactly the same moral principles which one 
might choose to apply to oneself. Augustine expressly gives 
assent to this principle when he denies to individuals the right 
of self-defense, but confirms to the Roman government the
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obligation to make war and to carry out capital punishments 
(Langan 177). In Just War. Political Realism and Faith. Bernard 
Adeney quotes Epistle 475, in which Augustine proclaims
As to killing others to defend one’s life, I do not 
approve of this, unless one happens to be a soldier 
or a public functionary acting not for himself but in 
defense of others or of the city in which he resides.
(33)
This is an Augustinian example of just war theory and of 
political realism. It also reflects the tension between Christian 
morality and effective political action. It is the somber 
distinction between the Earthly City and the Heavenly City in 
Augustine’s famous book. The City of God.
Morgenthau asserts that there can be no effective 
political morality without a complete consideration of the 
consequences of a proposed action which itself appears to be in 
accord with moral principles. This reflects A ugustine’s 
consequentialist views that, in judging any act, one must 
consider the intent of the actor. Morgenthau provides an 
illustrative example. In 1939, the Soviet Union invaded 
Finland. France and Great Britain were thereby obliged to 
consider two separate, but related, questions. The first 
question was whether the Soviet action was contrary to the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. If the invasion did violate 
the Covenant, the second question was what practical action 
would France and Great Britain take in their own interests.
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There was no question but that the Soviet Union had 
performed an act which the Covenant forbade. In response, 
France and Great Britain saw to it that the Soviet Union was 
expelled from the League. The question then became one of 
understanding how the Soviet invasion affected the interests of 
France and Great Britain and how the invasion affected the 
distribution of power between France and Great Britain on one 
hand and the Soviet Union and other potentially or actually 
hostile nations on the other hand. The major nation at that 
time hostile to France and Great Britain was Nazi Germany. 
Acting on high moral and legal principles alone, France and 
Great Britain prepared to join Finland in its war against the 
Soviet Union. They were prevented from this action only 
because Sweden refused permission for their troops to cross 
Swedish territory on their way to Finland. Had the Swedish 
refusal not prevented them, France and Great Britain would 
shortly have been at war with Nazi Germany and with the 
Soviet Union, to the considerable detriment of their national 
survival and of the well-being of their respective populations 
( 12).
This policy on the part of France and Great Britain 
Morgenthau calls a “classic example” of legalism and maudlin 
morality intruding into a political decision. Rather than
considering both morality and interests, France and Great 
Britain considered only a narrow morality of international law.
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The resulting decision had no relation to the higher issue of 
national survival (13).
F ifth . Realism is not willing to equate nationalism with 
the will or favor of deity or to equate the aspirations of a 
particular nation with “the moral laws which govern the 
un iverse” (11). M orgenthau provides a particu larly  
illuminating passage.
To know that nations are subject to the moral law is 
one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty 
what is good and evil in the relations among nations 
is quite another. There is a world of difference 
between the belief that all nations stand under the 
judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, 
and the blasphemous conviction that God is always 
on one’s side and that what one wills oneself cannot 
fail to be willed by God also.
The lighthearted equation between a particular 
nationalism  and the counsels of Providence is 
morally indefensible, for it is the very sin against 
which the Greek tragedians and the B iblical 
prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That 
equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable 
to engender the distortion in judgment which, in 
the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations 
and civilizations — in the name of moral principle, 
ideal, or God himself. (11)
Morgenthau maintains that it is exactly the considerations of 
interest defined by power that prevents m ost nations, 
including our own, from “moral excess and . . . political folly.” 
The United States is perhaps characterized by an excess of
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millenarian zeal but can respect the interests of foreign nations 
and promote its own interests. Moderation of moral judgment, 
Morgenthau tells us, results in moderation of policy, to the 
benefit of all (11). Aristotle and Augustine would agree.
Sixth, the differences between Realism and other theories 
of politics are real and profound. Realism has a “distinctive 
intellectual and moral attitude” (11). This attitude concerns 
itself with thought in the international political realm. The 
Realist is quite aware of modes of thought other than political 
modes based on a knowledge of human behavior and an 
understanding of interest. Realism differs from the “legalistic- 
moralistic approach” in that it refuses to “impose standards of 
thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere” 
(12) Realism thereby subserves moral ends by means of a 
penetrating understanding of the realities of human nature and 
of the admittedly brutal, anarchic international environment. 
One does not better oneself by ignoring unpleasant realities or 
by failing to act upon them.
Robert E. Osgood performed his doctoral work at Harvard 
University under the direction of McGeorge Bundy. As a young 
faculty member at the University of Chicago, he served under 
Morgenthau’s direction. The first edition of Osgood’s book 
Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign R ela tions was 
published in 1953, and a revised version published in 1964. 
Osgood presents a history of international political relations
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from the Spanish-American War to the Cold War. He also 
presents a compelling argument for the inclusion of moral and 
ethical principles in the practice of international relations.
Osgood respects ideals and moral values. “I accept the 
Christian-liberal-humanisnc ideals . . .” (20) he writes. Osgood 
expresses appreciation and admiration for “principles of right 
conduct” and “honesty, truthfulness, fidelity to obligations, 
kindness, fair play, lawfulness, nonintervention in other 
people’s affairs” (7).
Osgood also accepts the Realist view, and he claims that
Unrealistic expectations concerning human conduct 
encourage extravagant aspirations; and among 
nations, as among individuals, the result is apt to be 
disillusionment and an erratic fluctuation from one 
extreme in conduct to another. (3)
Combining these two streams of thought, Osgood’s central thesis 
is that one must judge a political act on a moral basis by the 
motive and also on a political basis by the outcome. The two 
judgments together are necessary for a right and proper 
appreciation of any political act. This is because a “rational 
assessm ent of self-interest” demands that the statesman 
respect the fact that “human nature demands that ideals 
supplement reason” (446). Calculations of pure self-interest 
are likely to lead to unfortunate results.
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Osgood’s modification of Morgenthau’s Realistic position is 
that transcendent ideals have played a significant role in 
determining American foreign policy. Osgood asserts that a 
steady and effective foreign policy devoid of moral appeal is 
scarcely conceivable” (447). This sentiment is merely a 
reflection o f Francis Schaeffer’s contention that humankind 
cannot function without an adequate conception o f morality 
and that this morality must have its basis in absolutes (14).
In his 1979 book Theorv of International— PqHtiq&, 
Kenneth N. W altz presents an extension o f Morgenthau s 
classical Realist international political theory. Terming his 
theory Structural Realism, or Neorealism, W altz distinguishes 
between reductionist and systemic international political 
theories. Reductionist theory in general concerns itself with 
the behavior o f parts or of small units. Reductionist 
international political theory therefore concerns itself with the 
behavior of individual nations. Thus reductionist theories 
explain international outcomes by means of elem ents and 
combinations of elements at the national or even sub-national 
level.
In “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” Waltz builds 
upon M orgenthau’s belief that international outcomes are the 
result of national characteristics. He claims that international 
outcom es are the resu lt certainly in part o f national 
characteristics but also of the influence and effects of a
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supranational system. In “Political Structures,” Waltz describes 
“the structures of the system and its interacting units” (94)
Such a political system is an ordering or an arrangement 
of the parts of the system. Political structures vary in three 
ways. First, they vary by ordering principles (81). The present 
international political system consists of about 150 sovereign 
or semisovereign actors which recognize for the most part no 
authority higher then their own. Therefore the international 
environment is one of anarchic self-help. This arrangement is 
in considerable contrast to that which prevails inside most 
national entities. There, the various governmental entities, 
bureaus, legislative bodies, and courts function in recognized 
hierarchies of authority and power.
Second, the political structures vary by specification of 
functions of the different parts (87). In “Theory of World 
Politics,” Keohane describes Waltz as claiming that the nations 
perform similar functions and that this second variable is of 
lesser importance. However, because of geography, historical 
heritage, or national character, many nations have quite 
distinct functions in the international community. For example, 
Switzerland has for many centuries functioned as a diplomatic 
neu tra l, re lay ing  m essages between nations at war. 
Switzerland arranged for the exchange of diplomats between 
Japan and the United States in 1942, and delivered peace
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feelers from Japan to the Soviet Union in 1945. Sweden has 
functioned similarly in recent centuries.
Third, structures vary by the relative capabilities or 
power of the units (92). In the present international system, 
Saudi Arabia, Austria, Iceland and Denmark all have military 
capabilities and powers of various sorts, including economic 
powers. These attributes are of a different nature and degree 
than those possessed by the former Soviet Union or the United 
States. Relative capabilities change over time. For example, 
modern Great Britain would not dare attempt any action in 
North America such as those accomplished in the period 1812- 
1815. Nor would Germany now attempt military operations in 
North Africa.
By means of these considerations. Waltz expands classical 
international political Realism into a deductive theory with 
claims to predictive power. This theory, called Structural 
Realism or Neorealism, considers system-wide processes to 
explain international events. It assumes that no supranational 
authority exists (Spanier 53). Thus study of interactions 
between nations is a reductionistic approach, whereas study of 
the behavior of the international system as a whole is a 
systemic approach.
N eorealistic theory identifies regularities of behavior 
within the international political system. These regularities are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1
recurring cycles of war and persistent systems wherein a 
balance of power obtains. The explanatory and predictive 
power of Neorealism lies in the fact that it predicts that these 
two phenomena necessarily follow from the nature of the 
system. They are intrinsically part of the international political 
system .
W altz’s Neorealism is a secular theory of international 
relations based, as we have seen, on strict observation of 
human nature and of the facts of the international regime. 
Other thinkers have reached the same conclusions based on 
somewhat different premises. Daniel 9:26 concludes that “unto 
the end, war and desolations are determined.” This statement 
must be predicated on Daniel’s observation that the secular 
system is not easily changed. M atthew  24:6-8 quotes Jesus’ 
conclusion, based on very abundant evidence available to Him, 
that “ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars . . .  for nation 
shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom . . .  all 
these are the beginning of sorrows.” Jesus may have projected 
his views from personal experience. In His childhood and 
adolescence. His home region of Galilee was repeatedly 
convulsed by sedition and guerrilla warfare against the 
Romans. He reasonably expected this to continue.
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CHAPTER 2 
AUGUSTINIAN MORAL BASIS 
INTRODUCTION
Several arguments might be adduced to support the 
proposition that the United States, with or without the 
cooperation of other nuclear-armed nations, has a moral 
imperative to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to 
parties deemed likely to use them in a detrimental manner. 
The argument selected for consideration in this study is based 
on the Christian ethics of Augustine of Hippo. It is the 
argument which he would most likely use in the present 
situation.
The international arena is one of the most amoral in 
human experience. For centuries, the principal factor in 
determining international relations has been expedience of 
policy. The morals of those policies have been a secondary 
consideration. Of all areas of human endeavor, it is possibly 
the most complex and most frustrating (Thompson 1). In Man. 
the State and War. Kenneth Waltz provides an overview:
22
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Each state pursues its own interests, however 
defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a means of 
achieving the external ends of states because there 
exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling 
the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among 
similar units. (238)
In this arena, various nations and sub-national groups seek to 
develop or to otherwise obtain nuclear weapons. The potential 
uses to which these destructive devices may be put has caused 
concern in the governments of the present nuclear powers and 
among thoughtful persons (Mandelbaum 22).
In response to this concern, John Deutch, formerly a 
faculty member and provost at M assachusetts Institute of 
Technology, form erly Undersecretary of Defense, and now 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has analyzed the 
present international scene relating to proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. He concludes in a Foreign Affairs article that the 
United States should “ . . . move nonproliferation to a higher 
priority” (132) Deutch recommends that the United States 
should:
• “publicly state that any use of a nuclear weapon 
would be considered a casus belli “
• “ p u b lic ly  s ta te  th a t v io la tio n  o f the 
[Nonproliferation Treaty] would trigger sanctions, including 
multilateral or unilateral military action”
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• “maintain military forces appropriate to make these
threats credible”
• upgrade and em phasize intelligence activ ities
against proliférant nations and groups
• extend security guarantees to nations willing to
forgo development of nuclear weapons
• establish bilateral arrangements, possibly through
the U.N. Security Council
• reemphasize inspection efforts of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (133)
These are com prehensive recommendations of serious
import, set forth by a recognized expert. Kenneth N. Luongo,
writing in N u c le u s  on behalf of the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, advocates a broadly similar set of policies which fall 
short of a formal declaration of war against any power which 
would use a nuclear weapon (1). Other authors have advocated
that various measures be taken. The essential element of all
these suggestions is that the United States, other nuclear 
powers or the United Nations should take active measures to 
dissuade or actively to prevent presently non-nuclear powers 
from acquiring nuclear weapons.
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Many commentators have raised issues of the morality of 
war and the morality of nuclear war (Thompson). Fewer have 
addressed the issue of the moral basis on which the presently 
nuclear-armed nations impose their will in a manner similar to 
that suggested by Deutch upon nations deemed likely to 
proliferate or to use a nuclear weapon after proliferation. The 
purpose, then, of this study is to examine, from the Augustinian 
position, the moral basis by which the United States and other 
nuclear powers impose such nonproliferation measures on 
other nations.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A nuclear weapon functions rapidly to release copious 
quantities of energy. The result is an explosion and release of 
radiation. When a nuclear weapon detonates a few hundred 
feet above a target at the earth’s surface, a fireball and blast 
wave rapidly form and extend to the surface. At the ground, 
the fireball reaches temperatures of thousands of degrees and
incinerates virtually everything for several miles in all
directions. The blast wave shatters any man-made object and,
depending on the weapon’s design and other factors, can also 
excavate several hundred feet into the earth. The blast wave 
overturns locomotives, damages and distorts structures, and
translates other objects. Electromagnetic radiation ignites
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flammable objects. Ionizing radiation accompanies the 
explosion and causes damage to objects and trauma and death 
to living organisms. The fireball and residue from the target 
coalesce into a column of dust and smoke which rises for miles 
into the atmosphere. Soon after, radioactive particles settle out 
downwind from the site, producing “fallout” that is dangerous 
to humans for decades if not centuries. Despite a considerable 
number of experiments, nuclear explosive devices have not yet 
been put to practical peaceful use.
A bomb using chemical explosives is relatively limited in 
the amount of damage which it can cause, and the damage is 
limited in areal extent. During the 1940 air attacks on London, 
residents could take shelter from conventional bombs in the 
subway system or in ordinary fortifications and redoubts of 
various configurations. For the general population, there is no 
sim ilar defense against a nuclear weapon, which is 
incomparably more destructive. In America, for example, 
perhaps the only completely effective shelter from nuclear 
attack is the deep underground facilities for a few military 
personnel at Cheyenne Mountain, near Colorado Springs, 
Colorado. The ultimate survivability of even that redoubt is an 
open question. Any nuclear weapon is much less precise than 
is a conventional weapon; collateral damage to objects and 
persons not under attack is inevitable. For the general 
population, there are only two effective defenses against a 
nuclear weapon. One is to not be in the vicinity when a nuclear
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weapon functions. Much the better choice is to prevent, 
possibly by political means, the construction of the device in 
the first place
The interests of America, and the interests of mankind, 
are that no surface detonation of a nuclear weapon ever take 
place again. One way to prevent a surface detonation is to 
credibly threaten those persons, organizations and states which 
would be inclined to use an existing nuclear weapon with a 
comparable response. Thus forms a balance of terror; a 
common phrase has been “mutually assured destruction.” The 
idea is that no party would use a nuclear weapon on another 
because of fear of a similar response by the party attacked. 
Until recently, this was the situation regarding the United 
States and the former Soviet Union. A more recent concern has 
been the proliferation o f nuclear weapons m aterial and 
technology to Third World nations, to subnational groups and to 
entirely informal groups. It is not clear that a nuclear standoff 
would be effective in these new circumstances.
A second method of control is to prevent presently non­
nuclear parties deemed likely to use nuclear weapons from 
acquiring or constructing them. This idea forms the basis of 
the nonproliferation efforts by the Western nations presently 
maintaining nuclear arsenals. This method depends on 
diplomatic efforts, control and denial of nuclear materials and
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necessary tooling, and control and denial of access to the 
information required to construct a nuclear weapon.
PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Augustine’s Philosophy 
Human Rationality
In the C onfessions 5:3, Augustine describes the efforts of 
m a th em atic ian s and astronom ers to p red ic t natural 
phenomena. These men used observations and mathematics to 
predict partial and total eclipses of the sun and moon. “They 
calculated the day and the hour of the eclipse,” Augustine 
writes, “and whether it would be total or partial, and their 
reckonings were found correct because it all happened as they 
predicted.” Augustine points out that the scientists “wrote 
down the principles which they had discovered” and that other 
persons could read these documents and put the theories to the 
test by seeing if the predictions reflected observed reality, 
which they in fact did.
A ugustine  notes further tha t th is “ reason and 
understanding,” that is, this rationality, has its source in God. 
In L e tte r  120, Augustine proclaims that rationality is “that 
faculty by which He [God] made us superior to all other living
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beings” (130) Augustine is careful to define God. In 
C on fessio n s 10:24 he writes, “I found my God, who is Truth 
itself.” In C onfessions 4:15, Augustine refers to God as “the 
supreme good that does not vary.” Pine-Coffin’s translation of 
C o n fessio n s quotes the English-language Knox Bible where 
Augustine quotes Scripture. In C onfessions 4:15, Augustine 
quotes Ja m e s  1:17: “with you there can be no change, no 
swerving from your course.” The more literally-translated K ing 
James Bible puts it somewhat more clearly, “. . . with whom is 
no variableness, neither shadow of turning.” The central Greek 
word is JcapaA,A.aYn which George Berry’s interlinear Greek-
English Bible translates as “variation.”
In C onfessions 4:15, Augustine continues, “It seemed to 
me that this unity was the seat of the rational mind and was 
the natural state of truth and perfect goodness.” Augustine 
thus conceives of God as invariable. This invariableness is the 
source of truth, goodness and human rationality. As he 
describes in C onfessions 6, Augustine came to understand that 
the God of the Bible speaks and acts with sense and precision. 
Augustine’s deity is thus a God of reason and order, as he 
describes in The Trinity 6, Mankind, created by this God, has 
not only the gift of reason and order, but also the obligation to 
use these gifts in a wise and rational manner. Socrates, it may 
be noted, took a similar position, that his rational inquiries 
regarding truth were a result of his obedience to deity as he
understood the term (61).
Reproduced with permission ot the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
To em phasize the source of reason, Augustine in 
C onfessions 5:3 chides the very scientists who have rationally 
discovered methods to calculate eclipses. Although their 
reason comes from  the invariable God, in pride they 
nevertheless ascribe it to their quite variable selves. It is an 
example of the variable, the derivative, and the partial 
claiming that which properly belongs to the invariable, the 
integral, the whole. This, Augustine believes, is inappropriate, 
because it is a form of self-aggrandizement which he finds in 
himself and describes in Confessions 10:36. Therein, alluding 
to Isaiah 14:13-14, Augustine objects to self-aggrandizement 
because it leads to one’s being “proud of his wicked end 
achieved.” However, he does succeed in this discussion in 
establishing the basic position, that humans have a rational 
element in their nature and that this element derives from a 
God Who is rational specifically because He does not change.
Irrationality
Augustine presents two arguments concerning human 
irrationality. In the first argument, in Citv of God 11:21, 
Augustine describes “ G od’s . . . unchangeable w ill.” In 
C o n fessio n s 4:15 he “concluded that in goodness there was 
unity.” Augustine finds also that “the disunion consisted of 
irrational life . . . .  and was the natural state of the ultimate
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evil.” He continues by describing himself as “changeable" or 
variable. He addresses God as “your unchangeable substance, 
my God.” Thus Augustine sees changeableness or variableness 
as the ultimate source of evil. This evil often manifests itself to 
Augustine as “irrational life” or “discord.” This disunion or 
variableness “leads to crimes of violence and [to] the lust that 
leads to sins of passion.”
A ugustine’s second argum ent concerning human 
irrationality is based on his experiences with the Manicheans, 
as described in C onfessions 5:3. The fundamental doctrine of 
the Manicheans was that the principles of Good and Evil have 
continuously existed. The principles are also known as Light 
and Darkness. According to this doctrine, the Evil invaded the 
Good and captured part of it. Therefore, the material universe 
is composed of a mixture of these principles, which are in 
continuous conflict.
In contrast to the astronomers and mathematicians, the 
Manicheans could not make rational predictions, and could not 
give a convincing explanation for the philosophical positions 
which they took (C onfessions 5:5). Augustine could find “no 
reasonable explanation” for the Manichean position, and what 
w as exp la ined  he found “ ex tre m e ly  in co h eren t.” 
“Presum ption,” he also calls these ideas, and says that 
Manichean doctrines are “repugnant and should be entirely 
rejected.” Augustine thus concludes that their doctrines are
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irrational and not applicable to human needs. In this, 
Augustine demonstrates that human nature has a significant 
element of irrationality.
Human Nature
In C onfessions 4:15, Augustine states that “m an’s mind is 
not the supreme good that does not vary.” As set forth there, 
Augustine’s position is that the supreme good is invariable. 
The ultimate good therefore is invariable, unchanging, unitary, 
and rational. By contrast, the ultimate evil is variable, 
changing, multiple, and irrational. This establishes a principle 
of capital importance: the variable things could not be variable
were there not a great invariable against which to measure 
them. Thus variables of human existence can be evaluated or 
measured against a fixed, invariable coordinate. Augustine 
continues with this theme, and relates it to human happiness in 
On Free Choice of the Win 2:19 wherein he states that “the 
happy life, that is, the disposition of a soul that cleaves to the 
unchangeable good, is the proper and principal good for a 
human being.”
In C onfessions 4:15, Augustine is careful to establish the 
ultimate source of evil. He says that “I loved the peace that 
virtue brings and hated the discord that comes of vice. From 
this I concluded that in goodness there was unity, but in evil
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disunion of some kind. It seemed to me that this unity was the 
seat of the rational mind and was the natural state of truth and 
perfect goodness; whereas the disunion consisted of irrational 
life . . . .  and was the natural state of the ultimate evil.” The 
same view has been developed from  a non-C hristian 
perspective. In The Nicomachean Ethics 6:2, Aristotle (138 
[1 1 3 8 ^ 3 5 -1 1 3 9 ^ 2 2 ]) presents a broadly similar argument: 
“There are two parts [of human nature] which grasp a rational 
principle — one by which we contemplate the kind of things 
whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we 
contemplate variable things.” Thus the idea of variable and 
invariable principles is an old one, and of the greatest 
importance in human affairs.
Augustine, continuing in Confessions 7:16, defines evil, or 
wickedness, as a “perversion of the will,” a natural inclination 
for “things of the lowest order,” that is, for vice and corruption 
of every sort. In mentioning “the lowest order” he also clearly 
includes that which is harmful or injurious to persons and to 
society, and that which leads to suffering. Augustine thus 
conceives of evil as more than morally wrong behavior or 
wrong attitudes which produce wrong behavior.
In C onfessions 10:36, Augustine identifies the result of 
evil. It is the “enemy of our true happiness.” This principle or 
personage wants Augustine “to divorce my joy from the truth. .
. . to enjoy being loved and feared, not for [God’s] sake, but in
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[His] place.” That is, he wants to usurp the place of God. Thus 
when Satan revolted against God, as described in Isaiah 14, it 
was the revolt of the variable against the invariable, of the 
changing against the constant, or of the particular against the 
universal. An attempt on the part of the variable to alter the 
invariable, or to actually displace or become the invariable, is 
the ultimate insult to God.
This enemy wants to place Augustine in “the bonds of 
common punishm ent” (C o n fe s s io n s  10:36) which would 
destroy Augustine’s happiness. Augustine calls this principle 
evil because it leads to a departure from the invariable God, 
the Truth, toward the variable, the false. For Augustine, and 
for mankind, a departure from invariables and from truth is 
necessarily a departure from true happiness and toward 
misery and degradation.
A ugustine believed that human nature therefore 
necessarily contains a significant element of evil. In On F ree 
Choice of the Will 3:17, he states that “a perverse will is the 
cause of all evils.” This perverse will originates in the first 
humans. Augustine summarizes in Citv of God 14:13, “Our first 
parents fell into open disobedience because already they were 
secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had 
not an evil will preceded it.” In C onfessions 1:7, Augustine 
describes the results of an intrinsic evil will, giving as examples 
the attempts of infants to strike and hurt others, and jealousy
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in a baby. Augustine writes, “[i]f babies are innocent, it is not 
for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength.” This is 
another way of saying that babies are not innocent at all, but 
naturally selfish and given to degradation and evil. They 
automatically incline toward jealousy and violence. Any parent 
can make the same observations. To train children to be bad is 
not necessary; that comes naturally. Rather, children must be 
trained to be good, a not insignificant task in this day. 
Augustine concludes his discussion of sinful infants in 
C o n fe s s io n s  1:19 by mentioning that “these same passions 
remain with us while one stage of life follows upon another.” 
Human evil as a continuing inward condition, Augustine would 
teach us, is a lifetime problem, as indeed it was for him. It is a 
problem for the saintliest persons. The Apostle Paul, writing in 
R om ans 7:15, finds, “That which I do I allow not: for what I 
would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.” Paul relates in 
Romans 7:21, “when I would do good, evil is present with me.”
Augustine provides a second illustration of human evil in 
his personal experience with theft. As a youth, he stole pears 
from a nearby vineyard. He did so, not because he was in want 
of food, but for the pleasure of “doing something that was 
forbidden” (Confessions 2:4). He strongly condemns himself for 
this desire to perform a forbidden act purely because it is 
forbidden. Augustine concludes that there are persons, 
including himself, who would commit evil acts simply for the
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pleasure of it. It is human nature, part of the natural order of 
things resulting from a departure from the invariable.
Augustine sets forth a third example of the degraded 
human condition in C o n fe s s io n s  2:5. This regards murder, 
regarded in every culture and at every time as evil. One may 
commit murder for many reasons, claims Augustine, for 
example for the desire for a victim’s property or wife. Robbery 
or revenge are two additional motives. Observation of 
contemporary news media confirm that human nature has not 
changed since Augustine’s time. However, Augustine asks if 
one might commit murder for nothing but the pure delight of 
killing. In effect, he answers the question in the affirmative in 
C onfessions 6:8 when he describes his friend Alypius’ visit to a 
gladiatorial contest. There is no question that the Roman 
authorities had arranged for men to kill each other — to 
commit evil acts — for no other reason but the pleasure which 
it might afford to those who cared to watch. There is no 
difference in the human condition today, as is shown by boxing 
matches, which often lead to serious injuries and death. 
Several years ago, I read a sociological survey which concluded 
that upwards of 80% of people who attend the Indianapolis 500 
motor races do so in hopes of seeing a fatal accident. Numerous 
recent cinematic works offered for public entertainm ent 
feature almost continuous violence and bloodshed. As the 
gladiatorial combats of old and the modern entertainments 
appallingly demonstrate, people will pay for the opportunity to
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take pleasure in killing. This predilection toward killing for 
pleasure leads to unpleasant results in the international arena, 
because human nature necessarily drives national behavior 
(Keohane 201).
Original Sin
Augustine ascribes these evil activities to a universal 
state of evil known as original sin. Augustine’s conception is 
shown in C o n fe ss io n s  7:21, where he quotes R om ans 7:23. 
Therein the Apostle Paul complains that he is a “captive to that 
disposition toward sin.” Paul clearly understands that this 
innate disposition results from a departure from the invariable 
because he mentions in R o m a n s  1:23 that mankind has 
“changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image 
made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted 
beasts, and creeping things.” Paul, like Augustine, gives the 
result in G a la tia n s  5:19-20, which reads in the King James 
B ib le . “Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are 
these; adultery , fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, 
idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, 
seditions, heresies.”
Augustine further acknowledges this moral state in 
C o n fe s s io n s  1:7 by asking, “where or when was I . . . ever 
innocent?” He would reply to his own question that he was
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never innocent. He asks in Confessions 9:1, “what evil is there 
that I have not willed to do?” There is no such evil as to lie 
outside of Augustine’s will, nor, he would say with the Apostle 
Paul, anyone else’s.
The Human Condition 
Evil Is Normal
A ugustine  has clearly  estab lished  from personal 
experience and from observation of others that humankind is 
given to an intrinsic moral depravity. Humans, for example, 
easily commit murder for sport or pleasure. The inescapable 
conclusion is that war is a normal state of human affairs. 
Augustine might quote M atthew  24:6-8 in which Jesus Christ 
says, in pertinent part, “ . . . . ye shall hear of wars and rumors 
of wars . . . nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom 
against kingdom.” This is exactly the view of Keohane and 
other modern political Realists. Keohane (p. 201) writes that 
“the evil inherent in man is at the root of war and conflict.”
Other recent authors reach the same conclusion. In his 
book The Profession of Arms. General John Hackett mentions, 
“From the beginning of man's recorded history physical force, 
or the threat of it, has always been freely applied to the 
resolution of social problems” (9). In The Decline of the West.
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Oswald Spengler comments on the universality and brutality of 
war, as does John Farrenkopf in a more recent work.
William C. Westmoreland commanded for several years 
the American military forces in Vietnam. He found, as did 1, 
that war brings out the worst in human behavior. In his book 
A Soldier Reports, he writes with anguish that
When 1 learned of irregularities, 1 directed a 
re le n tle ss  in v e s tig a tio n . T hat d ish o n e s ty , 
immorality, and other irregularities have occurred 
in all wars was no excuse. Although 1 had hoped
that Vietnam would be an exception and had 
worked hard to that end, it followed the pattern.
What is the answer? Is human nature so fallible 
that even the best efforts inevitably fall short?
(285)
The General’s observations, my personal experiences, as well as 
the testimony of Augustine and Paul show that human nature 
is indeed that fallible, and even more so. 1 was a young
lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers stationed at Ft. Benning, 
Georgia, during the time that Lieutenant William “Skip” Calley 
was on trial there for his alleged actions regarding the alleged 
massacres at My Lai, Vietnam. My living quarters and 
occasional duty station were only a few blocks from the 
building in which the trial took place. It was a sobering
experience, the memory of which will remain with me for a 
lifetime. Incomparably more memorable were the shocking 
experiences concerning human depravity which awaited me a
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year later in Vietnam, where I commanded a platoon of 
so ld iers and d irected  sm all-unit m ilitary  engineering 
operations under combat conditions. General Westmoreland’s 
comments are telling; he would have human beings observe 
and practice morality, but, as he and 1 found, they “inevitably 
fall short,”
In Just War. Political Realism and Faith. Bernard Adeney 
comments on Augustine’s views concerning human nature and 
war. Augustine, Adeney summarizes, saw war as a fact of life. 
He attempted to unite the very rigorous demands of Christian 
love with a penetrating understanding of political realities and 
with a very pessimistic view of human nature. A basic 
principle of the Augustinian view, according to Adeney, is that 
the soldier must be authorized to commit acts of war; he must 
not act on his own (28). To use the phrase of John Rist in 
Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized, the soldier or politician 
must never act with “absolute freedom of choice” (292). This is 
the Augustinian basis of separation of powers and of checks 
and balances in modem political theory and of the Augustinian 
Christian just war theory.
Irrational Exercise of Evil
In C o n fessio n s 10:36, Augustine mentions a difficulty 
which he had not overcome even after years of effort as a
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Christian. Following the evil principle or personage, “it is the 
desire to be feared or loved by other men, simply for the 
pleasure that it gives. . . ” Augustine finds that, “when men 
hold certain offices in human society, it is necessary that they 
should be loved or feared by other men.” This is a direct result 
of the previously mentioned desire on the part of the variable 
to displace the invariable. Augustine acknowledges his 
variableness in C onfessions 10:17 when he asks, “What is my 
nature? A life that is ever varying, full of change.” This 
variableness is the essence of the human experience.
From that fact, because of their inclination toward evil, 
and because of the irrational aspect of humanity, it is clear that 
some humans are likely to exercise evil in an irrational 
manner, perhaps to further their own variable needs for self- 
aggrandizement. Over history, many have done so. Ghengiz 
Khan, Adolph Hitler, and a dreary list of other irrational 
personages in world affairs provide examples of what irrational 
persons tend to do when they need not answer to a higher 
authority. These persons are irrational because they do not 
“rejoice in the truth,” as Augustine says in C onfessions 10:23. 
Rather, they rejoice in their own variableness. They “wish to 
deceive, but [not] to be deceived.” Such unstable men will stop 
at nothing; hideous suffering and millions of deaths are of no 
importance to them. By Augustine’s analysis, for example, 
Saddam Hussein would clearly be regarded as an irrational 
actor in that he has used chemical weapons on his own
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countrymen and kinfolk, simply for the pleasure of killing or of 
being feared. O ther, unimaginable, motivations are also 
possible. One shudders to think what actions the natural 
inclinations of Adolph Hitler or Saddam Hussein would lead to 
with a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it. Augustine 
knows. In On Free Choice of the Will 1:8, he describes “human 
attributes . . . such as the love of praise and fame, and the will 
to power. When that drive [for such things] is not subject to 
reason, it makes us wretched.”
In Cl tv of God 1:30, Augustine relates the experience of 
the Romans after they defeated Carthage and thus could aspire 
without restraint to R ist’s “absolute freedom of choice.”
Certainly your desire for peace, and prosperity, and 
plenty is not prompted by any purpose of using 
these blessings honestly, that is to say, with 
moderation, sobriety, temperance, and piety; for 
your purpose rather is to run riot in an endless 
variety of sottish pleasures, and thus to generate 
from your prosperity a moral pestilence which will 
prove a thousandfold more disastrous than the 
fiercest enemies. It was such a calamity as this that 
Scipio, your ch ief pontiff, your best man in the 
judgment of the whole senate, feared when he 
refused to agree to the destruction of Carthage, 
Rome’s rival; and opposed Cato, who advised its 
destruction. He feared security, that enemy of 
weak minds, and he perceived that a wholesome 
fear would be a fit guardian for the citizens. And 
he was not mistaken: the event proved how wisely
he had spoken. For when Carthage was destroyed, 
and the Roman republic delivered from its great 
cause of anxiety, a crowd of disastrous evils 
forthwith resulted from the prosperous condition of
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things. First concord was weakened, and destroyed 
by fierce and bloody seditions; then followed, by a 
concatenation of baleful causes, civil wars, which 
brought in their train  such m assacres, such 
bloodshed, such lawless and cruel proscription and 
plunder, that those Romans who, in the days of 
their virtue, had expected injury only at the hands 
of their enemies, now that their virtue was lost, 
suffered greater cruelties at the hands of their 
fellow-citizens. The lust of rule, which with other 
vices existed among the Rom ans in more 
unmitigated intensity than among any other people, 
after it had taken possession of the more powerful 
few, subdued under its yoke the rest, worn and 
w earied.
In short, the Romans, directly they had freed themselves from 
the restraint imposed by an international balance-of-power 
system, made themselves wretched. Augustine’s is a strong 
argument in favor of a balance -of -power international political 
regime and against schemes of one world government. In 
Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized. Rist comments on this 
dolorous condition to the effect that
A just consensus has been reached that one of 
Augustine’s great strengths is his power to observe 
and document the disastrous and terrifying results 
which come about when men, singly or in groups, 
are able to grasp at absolute freedom of choice. 
Intellectuals once dreamed — and persuaded others 
to dream — that with the development of improved 
social and educational conditions, the moral 
behavior of individuals would likewise improve. On 
such a view the history of twentieth century Europe 
should have been one of moral progress and 
enlightenment. The SS, the concentration camps 
and gulags, not to speak of the millions of the
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aborted and the callousness towards the starving 
‘Third World’ have demonstrated the shallowness of 
that kind of optimism. Augustine’s sombre account 
of the workings of the ‘earthly city’ looks far more 
challenging than it did to the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century liberal, who thought he had 
outgrown Hobbes’ similarly ‘Augustinian’ account of 
the state of ‘nature.’ In particular, in this century,
we have seen star instances of an Augustinian 
libido dom inandi. of a sheer lust for power at its 
crudest: “power,” said Goering, “is my fist at your
throat.” (292)
Use of Nuclear Weapons
In Confessions 10:23, Augustine expresses his conviction 
that, “[w]e cannot therefore be certain that all men desire true 
happiness, because there are some who do not look for joy  in 
[God].” Of course, there are those who do not look for joy at all. 
These persons are unhappy “because they attend far more 
closely to other things whose power to make them unhappy is
greater than the power of their dim memory of truth to make
them happy” (C o n fe s s io n s  10:23). These “other th ings” 
typically are fame, desire for approval of others, desire to be 
feared as Augustine mentions, all rooted in variableness and 
evil. It is human nature.
Augustine would warn us that there are certainly a few 
such individuals who would use the very great power of
nuclear weapons to make mankind unhappy. This, as
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Augustine wrote in C onfessions 4:15, would be the result of 
“evil disunion” and “irrational life.” It is an expression of the 
fact that mankind is “changeable.” Thus these persons are 
inconstant, variable, and evil (Evans, 1991). Augustine could 
well quote Jam es 1:8: “a double minded man is unstable in all 
his ways.” Therefore, proliferation of nuclear weapons to 
those nations, groups, or individuals deemed likely to use them 
irrationally, or as a result of their own unhappiness, is 
destabilizing in international relations and is contrary to the 
interests of all nations and persons.
THE JUDEAN SOLUTION 
Augustinian Philosophy of Salvation
Augustine’s solution to the basic problem of human 
depravity and evil is that offered by the Judean philosophers 
and theologians from Job and Abraham to the Apostles Paul 
and John.
In C onfessions 7:9, Augustine describes his encounters 
with the writings of the Platonists. These philosophers 
described God as powerful, desirable, worthy of respect. These 
philosophic ideals include the concept that God created the 
visible universe; that humankind has a relation to God, but is 
not divine; and that humankind is estranged from God. This
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philosophy, standing alone, Augustine finds to be inadequate 
although it identifies the basic human condition. It provides an 
inadequate concept of God and represents an inadequate moral 
base to guide human behavior because it does not propose a 
solution to the problem of sin. It provides no method by which 
variable, evil humankind may approach God, the Truth, the 
source of union and invariableness.
In the Christian philosophy, on the other hand, Augustine 
finds a satisfying solution to the problem of sin and of 
estrangement from God; he finds a guide to ethical and proper 
human behavior. In C on fessio n s 7:9 he pointedly mentions 
that in the Platonic writings he does not find that God came to 
live with hum ankind, thereby identifying Him self with 
mankind’s difficulties, as set forth in John  1:1-14. He finds 
absent from Platonic philosophy the profound idea in R om ans 
5:6 that God, in the person of Jesus Christ, “underwent death 
for us sinners.” Thus did Augustine come to understand that 
mankind has a deadly malady, a terminal disease resulting 
from having offended and disobeyed God, and that this 
difficulty is the source, the root cause, of all mankind’s 
problems. God had resolved the difficulty by Himself enduring 
the prescribed penalty, death, on behalf of any who would 
personally appropriate it. This idea is very old and was 
described about 2000 BC in Job 19:25 and in Job 33:22-30, 
which suggest that God would provide a redeemer to pay a 
price for the sinner’s faults.
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The solution therefore, as Augustine saw it, was to 
appropriate to himself, or personally give assent to, the 
sacrifice already made. Addressing God in C onfessions 8:12, 
Augustine proclaims, “You converted me to yourself, so that I 
no longer . . . placed any hope in this world but stood firmly 
upon the rule of faith.” This simple word “faith” — carrying the 
ideas of trust and personal appropriation of an invariable gift 
from the invariable God — is the essence of the Christian’s 
personal assent. It is what makes one a Christian.
Augustine’s assent to God’s solution permanently changed 
his life. Having been redeemed by the price that God had paid, 
Augustine wrote “ [I] had no intention of offering myself for 
sale” (Confessions 9:2). He began to live life on a higher plane, 
understanding that all things, all benefits, indeed his very 
existence, derive from a deity that Augustine could respect 
because He had voluntarily addressed the human need. This is 
one aspect of “contemplating truth” or of rejoicing in truth. It 
is a somewhat similar ideal to that of Aristotle’s that one “can 
contemplate truth” as described in The Nicomachean Ethics 
10:7-8 (264[1177a22]).
This was a new world view. God died on behalf of 
humankind, an act which has not been emulated before or 
since. Therefore by individual imputation of that righteous act, 
humans have the potential to regain their original standing of
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worth and dignity. In theology, imputation is the act whereby 
God ascribes, reckons, or attributes the goodness of the Savior 
to the believer, that is, to the person who gives his assent or 
trust. The continuing Christian position is that a perfect Person 
stands in the stead of the self-admitted im perfect ones, 
thereby affirming to each individual an intrinsic worth, a 
dignity, and a standing of respect before others. They have 
that ultimate dignity and worth because God has reckoned to 
them His Own dignity and worth. God ascribed His own 
invariableness to individual men and women. Human beings, 
now creatures of value, are not to be harmed, or abused in 
body or mind — certainly not atom bombed — for light reasons 
or at the whim of any variable irrational person or group. To 
do so to them is to do so to God, the ultimate invariable. Who 
stood and continues to stand in their moral stead.
The effect of this view has been historically unique and 
the consequences are profound. The world has been a different 
— and better — place since the crucifixion and resurrection.
The late Georgetown University professor of history Carroll 
Quigley, in his landmark modern history Tragedv and Hope. 
points out that no philosophy, creed or doctrine, at any time in 
human history, respects individual people and regards them as
having dignity, intrinsic worth, and rights as does Christianity.
He points out that the continuing results of Christianity have
been love, humility, social concern, humanitarianism, brotherly 
care, future preference, personal cleanliness, compassion.
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obligation , and p a rticu la rly , a ttem pts to lim it the 
destructiveness and misery of war (1120). In The God Who Is 
T h e re , theologian Francis Schaeffer continues this theme, 
pointing out that “the source of a real care for people a s 
individuals comes from biblical Christianity” (45, emphasis in 
original).
A Non-Christian Perspective
Leading philosophers and political scientists of different 
eras who represent philosophical outlooks very different from 
Augustine’s have nevertheless followed a sequence of thought 
similar to Augustine’s and have reached a similar conclusion. 
Their foundational conclusion is that human beings have a 
worth and that that worth is to be respected. Sun Tzu reasoned 
from a non-Christian perspective; Marcus Aurelius was clearly 
hostile to Christianity. Both men addressed the problem of 
human worth and societal worth as it relates to humankind’s 
basic evil inclination. Reasoning from a secular rationalistic 
viewpoint, Immanual Kant has also addressed the issue. These 
philosophers may disagree with Augustine as to the source of 
human worth, but the basic conclusion is that human beings 
are not to be harmed for nothing. This uniformity of basic 
approach within a diversity of philsophical presuppositions 
suggests that the Realistic view is neither new nor outmoded 
but, rather, that it is a constant and a truth.
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Sun Tzu
Sun Tzu is thought to have lived between about 500 B.C. 
and 300 B.C. He was a military commander of great renown 
and skill. During his lifetime, the region now known as China 
consisted of a number of contending states. Oswald Spengler 
has likened the situation then existing in China to that in the 
Classical world between the times of Alexander and Caesar, 
when several states were contending for supremacy. For 
twenty years. Sun Tzu commanded the military forces of the 
Kingdom of Wu in a successful combination of brilliant 
diplomacy and parsimonious military action.
Sun Tzu united a vigorous realistic view of international 
politics with a firm sense of moral values. “The true object of 
war is peace,” he wrote in The Art of War (7), in complete 
agreement with Augustine’s views on just war. Therefore Sun 
Tzu maintained effective military forces ready for instant use, 
but preferred to further the interests of the Kingdom of Wu by 
means of diplomatic initiatives and devious stratagems. “True 
excellence,” Sun Tzu writes, “is to plan secretly, to foil the 
enemy’s intentions . . .  so that at last the day may be won 
without shedding a drop of blood” (20). This rational approach 
Sun Tzu devised for two reasons: first, to avoid imposing upon 
the people of Wu the ruinous costs of war in blood and treasure 
and, second, to preserve civil tranquillity. These are both
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 1
qualities of great moral value and reflect Sun Tzu’s underlying 
concept that the people of Wu have worth and that that worth 
is to be respected. This respect is to be extended to the enemy, 
in Sun Tzu’s view. Sun Tzu describes the results of extended 
military campaigns; taxation, untended crops, disruption of 
family values, and excessive loss of life. These things, he 
believes, are best avoided when possib le and otherwise 
minimized, agreeing exactly with Augustine’s views of the evils 
of war.
Sun Tzu advocated a highly developed espionage system. 
It is the ‘‘height of inhumanity,” he w rites, to minimize 
intelligence functions to save money. This is because the 
expenditure of a relatively small amount of money and effort 
for espionage typically yields great savings in military costs, 
and in lives (77).
When war cannot be avoided, the correct action in Sun 
Tzu’s moral view is to wage it as rapidly and effectively as 
possible. “Cleverness has never been associated with long 
delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited 
from prolonged warfare,” he writes (13). This wise approach 
minimizes the necessity for long conscriptions and high taxes; it 
also minimizes casualties. These are high moral values, and 
Sun Tzu appears as a humanitarian leader concerned with and 
solicitous of the soldiers under his command and with the 
population at large, including the soldiers and population of the
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enemy. As Osgood describes in Ideals and Self-Interest in 
America’s Foreign Relations, this is the epitome of the Realistic 
moral position, respecting the realities of international affairs 
and also respecting the moral values which characterize the 
best of human life (442). For Sun Tzu, the hard imperatives 
deriving from considerations of national survival subserve the 
higher moralities of a peaceful, productive and livable civil 
society. He takes this position entirely from his respect of the 
worth of the people of Wu, as would Augustine.
Marcus Aurelius
Reasoning from non-Christian presuppositions, Marcus 
Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) reaches the same conclusion as does 
Augustine in the fifth century. As emperor of Rome, Aurelius
directed the affairs of the empire, including a war in Parthia,
and he personally commanded several major military efforts
against the Germanic tribes then endangering the Roman 
system. An adherent of the Stoic philosophy, he can in no 
manner be considered a personal Christian or an adherent of a 
Christian world-view. Indeed, he was somewhat hostile to 
Christianity. As time allowed, he wrote “The M atters
Addressed to H im self,” a record of personal thoughts and 
insights now known as M ed ita tio n s. As a result of Aurelius’ 
many duties and civic obligations. M ed ita tions has a certain 
disjointed character. It does, however, provide a sufficient
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basis from the Stoic philosophy to reach the same conclusion 
regarding nonproliferation which Augustine would reach.
In M ed ita tio n s . Aurelius appeals repeatedly to reason 
in much the same way as does Augustine. “Intelligence and 
Reason make their way through every impediment,” Aurelius 
writes in M editations 10:33. In Aurelius’ Stoic philosophy, this 
reason exists to guide one through life: “From living according
to the reason of thy nature no one can prevent thee,” he writes 
in M editations 6:58.
Aurelius also perceives an evil and irrational aspect of 
humankind. In M editations 7:70, he describes “worthless men 
who are what they are and so many.” In M edita tions 9:42, he 
reflects
When thou art offended by shamelessness in any 
one, put this question at once to thyself: Can it be 
then that shameless men should not exist in the 
world? It can not be. Then ask not for what can 
not be. For this man in question also is one of the 
shameless ones that must needs exist in the world.
Thus for Aurelius it is inconceivable that humans should not 
behave in a shameless or wicked manner. He describes 
“unbridled arrogance” in M editations 11:6 and “pomposity and 
pride” in M e d ita t io n s  9:29. These comments agree with 
Augustine’s treatment of human behavior in Ci tv of God 14 and 
in On Free Choice of the Will 2:18 where he writes that “we fell
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
voluntarily.” Aurelius and Augustine significantly never
exclude themselves from their own caustic remarks.
Applying the principles of rationality leads in Aurelius’ 
Stoic thought to three general principles for guidance to action. 
These are, first, an “uncompromising resistance to bodily 
inclinations” (M editations 7:55). This is the essence of Stoic 
self-control. Second, Aurelius finds civic duty. “The rational is 
indisputably also the civic,” he writes in M editations 10:2. He 
concludes that he should behave so that his “present work is 
that of a living creature, intelligent, social, and under one law” 
(M e d ita tio n s  8:2). The third principle is human worth, the 
same conclusion that Augustine reaches. Human beings have
worth, Aurelius writes in M editations 9:1, because
the Nature of the Universe has fashioned rational 
creatures for the sake of one another with a view to 
mutual benefit based upon worth, but by no means 
for harm. The transgressor . . . acts with obvious 
im piety.
Aurelius summarizes his position in M ed ita tions 11:18. 
First, human beings “came into the world for the sake of one 
another.” That is, humans have rationality and worth. Second, 
some humans will behave irrationally and evilly. “If not 
rightly, then it is obviously . . . through ignorance.” Third, such 
persons must be corrected, for their own good and for the good 
of the civic weal. “When a chance is given, exhort him mildly 
and, at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm,
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quietly teach him a better way,” with the least violence and 
harm possible. A national leader has a moral obligation to do 
this because, as Aurelius writes in M editations 11:18,
To expect the bad not to do wrong is worthy of a 
madman; for that is to wish for impossibilities. But 
to acquiesce in their wronging others, w hile 
expecting them to refrain from wronging thee, is 
unfeeling and despotic.
This is the essence of the nonproliferation argument.
Immanuel Kant
Taking a rationalistic approach rather than a Christian 
one, Immanuel Kant developed in Groundwork o f the 
Metaphvsic of Morals an argument which supports a conclusion 
similar to that of Augustine and Aurelius. Kant finds a 
shortcoming on the part of the human race. “If we look more 
closely at our scheming and striving, we everywhere come 
across the dear self, which is always turning up,” he writes 
(75). This is the natural state of humankind, as Augustine 
claims. Kant also notes that the results are “extremely bad and 
hurtful when the will is not good” (61), which agrees with 
Augustine’s treatment of the will in On Free Choice of the Will. 
Kant proposes to remedy this defect by an appeal to duty, as 
defined by law. “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence 
to the law,” Kant states (68). He then establishes that one
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should “never act except in such a way that [one’s] maxim 
should become a universal law” (70). That is, one should act in 
such a manner as one would desire everyone to act. Kant uses 
the term “maxim” to mean “principle.” “Every rational being,” 
Kant writes, should be about “making universal law” (100).
Kant’s precept is exactly applicable to the problem of 
nonproliferation. He repeatedly uses the term “worth” (65, 69) 
as applied to human beings and describes “our very worthiness 
to be happy” (61). He would contend that human beings have 
worth and should not be atom bombed for irrational reasons. 
Informed, rational persons are devising a treaty — literally a 
universal law in the Kantian sense — to achieve that end.
Com m entary
Knowing that some would likely use nuclear weapons 
irrationally if they had them, Augustine would expect us to use 
our rationality to limit the destruction and misery of war. An 
inappropriate and irrational response would be to do nothing 
or to take action which would be less than fully effective. He 
would conclude that the rational thing to do is to keep nuclear 
weapons out of the control of irrational parties or those 
deemed likely wantonly to use them. Augustine views laws as 
the means by which this should be accomplished. In 
Confessions 3:7, he writes, “This is the law by which each age
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and place forms rules of conduct best suited to itself,” Thus 
Augustine encourages the modem world rationally to establish 
laws relating to the acquisition, use and testing of nuclear 
weapons, and by logical extension, to enforce those laws.
From these considerations, the Pope in medieval times 
forbade the use of crossbows in Europe. From the Thirty Years’ 
War to Bonaparte, European warfare was constrained by 
mutual consent. From the Concert of Europe in 1815 to 1914, 
European society, acting on Augustinian presuppositions, 
averted most potential wars. Latterly, efforts have been made 
by means of the Geneva Convention to forbid poison gas and 
soft-point bullets in warfare. The Kellogg-Briand pact is an 
attempt, naive as it may have been, to outlaw war itself. 
Whatever the pact’s efficaciousness, the attempt results from 
the pervasive m oral p rinc ip le , based on C hristian  
presuppositions, that war should be curtailed or eliminated to 
the extent possible, as Adeney describes (30). These 
overarching moral principles are active even in most of those 
who view themselves as outside the Christian faith. It is from 
precisely that moral position that the West now attempts to 
control nuclear weapons and to forbid their use, as is shown by 
numerous appeals for a global moratorium on nuclear weapons 
testing.
The nuclear powers are thus seen to be protecting the 
interests — the happiness — of their own citizens as well as
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those of humanity in directly opposing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to certain parties. Morgan and Wallerstein write that 
“constraining such developments is morally defensible” (298). 
As Augustine writes in C onfessions 12:25, quoting I Timothv 
1:8, the nuclear powers are “ ‘apply[ing] the law legitimately,’ 
that is, to the end of charity.” The charity which Augustine 
describes is love, concern, a desire for well-being, rightfully 
exercised toward all mankind.
International peace-keeping treaties are an appropriate 
expression of this concern. Any treaty is a law between
sovereign parties, and Augustine clearly establishes that such 
laws are needful and appropriate. In Confessions 3:7, he writes 
of “the law by which each age and place forms rules of conduct 
best suited to itself.” He continues by establishing that “justice 
[is not] erratic or variable, but . . . the times over which it 
presides are not always the same, for it is the nature of time to 
change.” In C on fessio n s 3:8, Augustine continues to develop 
the principle, that “no one, whether he is a native or a
foreigner, may, to suit his own pleasure, v iolate the 
conventions established by the customary usage or the law of
the community or the state.” To do such a thing, Augustine
continues, is “out of keeping with the whole.”
One such treaty to be discussed in this report is the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has the basic 
purpose of preventing or hindering the spread of nuclear
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
weapons technology and capab ility . Augustine would 
throughly approve of such a treaty. Implicit in the Treaty is a 
recognition of the human need for right and orderly living. 
Throughout The God Who Is There, theologian Francis Schaeffer 
contends that humankind cannot function without an adequate 
conception of morality and that this morality must have its 
basis in absolutes. B ib le s . A ugustine’s C o n fe s s io n s  and 
Aristotle’s Ethics, for example, sell well because of the human 
need for ideals and for right principles for living. Human 
nature demands nothing less and the CTBT rightly addresses 
the need.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty recognizes human 
nature as Augustine envisioned it. It recognizes that the 
unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to lead 
to tragic results, given humankind’s irrational, self-agrandizing 
nature. Therefore, the Treaty attempts to limit the spread of 
information and testing capability which would lead to nuclear 
weapons proliferation. This is entirely appropriate because 
Augustine establishes in A gainst Faustus 22:75 that the 
“natural order which seeks the peace of mankind ordains that 
the [national leaders] should have the power of undertaking 
war . . .  in behalf of the peace and safety of the comunity.” 
Thus Deutch’s notion (133) that use of a nuclear weapon would 
constitute a valid casus belli has the strongest support in 
Augustinian moral philosophy.
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CHAPTERS 
THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
The Emergency Management and Nonproliferation 
Division (EMND), acting under standing directives, provides 
generic treaty support to the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DoE) 
Nevada Operations Office (NV) and to Department of Energy 
headquarters. This section of the study examines the 
background and provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). It compares the present functions of the EMND 
under the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty with its 
anticipated required functions under the new Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. There are many similarities which can 
support the new effort, as well as some differences which 
require a tten tion . This section  con clu d es with  
recommendations concerning a redefinition of roles for EMND 
involvem ent with and support for DoE’s Office of 
Nonproliferation and National Security, and for changes to 
provide the desired support.
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ETHICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS
Attempts along Augustinian lines, and other attempts, to 
preserve the peace and to ameliorate the negative effects of 
war have a long history. Humankind has attempted to develop 
religious or ethical constraints against war, to outlaw it, and to 
create codes and councils for peaceful arbitration of disputes. 
Common also have been attempts to restrict the development 
or use of various weapons.
An early attem pt at unilateral arms control occurred 
about 1100 B.C. The Philistines imposed on the Israelites a 
policy restricting access to iron for weapons and tools. This 
policy put the Israelites at a significant disadvantage. (I Sam uel 
13:19). In a somewhat later age around 750 B.C., the author of 
Isaiah 2:2-4 presents a universal peaceful polity as the ideal of 
a future age. “They shall beat their swords into plowshares,” 
he writes, “N either shall they learn war anymore.” The 
ancients also attempted to mitigate the more brutal aspects of 
war. In The Republic. Plato quotes Socrates in about 450 B.C. as 
decrying the use o f poisoned weapons and poisoned water in 
warfare. Thus at an early time arms control proponents held 
peace as a desirable state, attempted to preserve the peace, 
and attempted to reduce the suffering and brutality of war 
when it did occur (Taylor).
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Medieval attempts at arms control for humanitarian 
purposes were also common. In the 900’s the Peace of God 
attempted to impose rules of war. In the lOOO’s the Truce of 
God attempted to control or eliminate war in Europe. In 1139, 
Pope Innocent II prohibited the use of crossbows in Europe, an 
early attempt at arms control and nonproliferation (Taylor).
Arms control agreements were also common in more 
modem times. In 1609, Hugo Grotius’ treatise On the Law of 
War and Peace proposed a ban on the use of poison. In 1817, 
the Rush-Bagot Agreement between the United States and the 
United Kingdom successfully demilitarized the Great Lakes. 
From 1899 to 1907, the Hague Peace Conference banned 
excessively destructive small-arms ammunition and poison gas 
from warfare. In 1928, the United States and France initiated 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war as an instrument of 
national policy. Eventually 63 nations acceeded to the treaty.
Many of these attempts were of limited effect, but that 
does not detract from the valid ethical and humanitarian 
principle that controlling arms and eliminating war insofar as 
possible are proper efforts for mankind. With modern 
capabilities in monitoring and inspection, the potential benefits 
conferred to humankind by arms control and nonproliferation 
efforts seem to be well worth the considerable effort involved 
(van der Vink and Park).
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INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN NONPROLIFERATION 
The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1971
From the beginning of the nuclear era, the need to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident. If a 
growing number of nations were to obtain nuclear weapons, or 
if terrorist or subnational groups were to obtain them, the risks 
of nuclear war would greatly increase. Such a war could occur 
as a result of accident, or by unauthorized use by a renegade 
official in an otherwise responsible nuclear power,^ or by 
escalation of a regional conflict. The possession of nuclear 
weapons by many nations would add a serious new threat to 
peace (Mazari, 1992). Rapid development of nuclear weapons 
by the Soviet Union (Cochran, 1989), United Kingdom, France 
and China made it apparent that many nations were capable of 
mastering nuclear technology.
Other developments emphasized the danger. By the 
1960’s, advances in technology enabled the operational use of 
nuclear power plants. The nuclear reactors of these plants 
produce plutonium as a by-product. This plutonium can be 
chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons (Perkovich, 1993; Panofsky, 1994).
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A cting on an unstated A ugustinian moral basis, 
worldwide initiatives sought to control proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 had as one of 
its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. 
The international effort continued, culminating in 1970 in the 
ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) provides, in pertinent
part:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
w hatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in 
any way to otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any 
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not 
to seek or receive any assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.
The 1970 NPT contains a provision that it will be 
reviewed and renegotiated after having been in force for 25 
years. The renegotiation convention thus authorized met in
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April 1995, considered necessary revisions, and renewed the 
NPT.
Kenneth N. Luongo points out that many non-nuclear 
weapons states have considered continued weapons testing by 
the nuclear weapons states to be a serious impediment to 
improving nonproliferation efforts. The NPT extension has been 
deemed of critical importance to U.S. security policy; and a U.S. 
commitment to the CTBT is thought necessary to gain 
international acceptance of the NPT extension.
United States Interest in Nonproliferation
The national interest of the United States is to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nations which presently 
do not have them. This policy is thought to contribute to 
international stability by reducing the risk of nuclear war 
(Bundy, Crowe and Drell). According to Anthony Lake, certain 
“backlash” states behave in a non-cooperative manner and are 
deemed to be candidates for nonproliferation measures. For 
example, Iran and Iraq exercise policy-driving ideologies which 
are hostile to U.S. interests. A nuclear Iraq or Iran, bordering 
the Persian G ulf petroleum supplies, would be particularly 
dangerous to U.S. interests and goals in the region (Lake; Pipes 
and Clawson). Michael T. Klare has described an accelerating 
conventional arms race in East Asia and Southeast Asia.
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Ideological differences, potential border disputes and trade 
disputes have the potential to develop into armed conflict. 
Edw ard L uttw ak has d escrib ed  p a rticu la rly  vicious 
conventional border warfare in South America. If nuclear 
weapons exist in East and Southeast Asia and in South America, 
the potential exists for their use. The United States’ trade and 
political interests are therefore likewise served by an ongoing 
worldwide policy of nonproliferation.
In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 
September 27, 1993, President Bill Clinton said,
I have made nonproliferation one of our nation’s 
highest priorities. We intend to weave it more 
deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships 
with the world’s nations and institutions. We seek 
to build a world of increasing pressure for 
nonproliferation, but increasingly open trade and 
technology for those states that live by accepted 
international rules. . . .  We will pursue new steps to 
control the materials for nuclear weapons. . . . The 
United States has also begun negotiations toward a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.
President Clinton thus acknowledges an Augustinian Realistic 
view of human nature and national behavior. Without 
“increasing pressure,” proliférant parties would clearly 
continue to pursue their goals, to the detriment of all persons.
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John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, emphasized this national commitment in an August 4, 
1994, speech to the Conference on Disarmament.
The United States seeks a CTBT that will bring an 
end to all nuclear explosions — period. No 
thresholds. No exceptions. And by that I mean not 
just ail explosions, but all states. Success demands 
in particular the full support and participation of all 
five nuclear weapons states. And we seek 
universal adherence.
Of course the United States and the other nuclear 
weapons states bear a special responsibility in this 
negotiation, and of course we also have special 
experience and knowledge that can aid it 
considerably. So we will continue to work closely 
with the other nuclear weapons states to propel this 
effort toward fruition.
Holum's remarks also contain a strong Augustinian element. By* 
the Augustinian argument set forth herein, the United States 
and other nuclear weapons states do indeed “bear a special 
responsibility” in an ethical sense, to attend to the issue of 
nonproliferation, and to do so in an effective manner.
Congressional Mandate
Nonproliferation has long been a m atter of intense 
Congressional interest. After extensive debate. Congress passed 
the Prevention and Control of the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act of 1993. That Act expresses Congress’
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belief and concern that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a 
serious threat to international peace and also to U.S. national 
security. The Act identifies the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Energy, and various intelligence organizations as 
possessing unique capability with regard to the
detection  and m onitoring o f proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction . . . and carrying out 
international monitoring and inspection regimes 
that relate to proliferation of such weapons.
The Act directs the relevant agencies to
maintain and improve their capabilities to identify, 
m onitor, and respond to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems 
for such weapons.
Congressional and Presidential authority thus exist for 
the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense 
and for the Department of Energy to conduct operations in 
various ways relating to nonproliferation. These operations 
consist primarily of monitoring, on-site inspections, research 
relating to improving capabilities, and the implementation of 
research  re su lts  for im provem ent of the agencies ' 
nonproliferation practice. The Department of Energy’s Nevada 
Operations Office (NV) has a major authority and responsibility 
in relation to these functions.
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International Legal Concerns
The basis of the m odern international system of 
sovereign nation-states is the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. 
That Peace ended a cycle of wars, including the Thirty Years’ 
W ar, and definitively superseded a prior system which in 
theory included a group of nations whose legitimacy and 
existence depended on ecclesiastical unity and authority. The 
new system recognized no secular authority higher than that of 
the sovereign nation. The present basis of international law 
lies in the system of treaties which those nations concluded to 
address mutual concerns.
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, 
authorizes Congress to “define and punish . . . Offenses against 
the Law of Nations.” This has been taken as an obligation to 
interpret and apply international law, in accordance with the 
Augustinian view of law set forth in C o n fessio n s 3:7-8. In 
addition, according to Article VI, treaties are to become the 
“supreme Law of the Land, and the judges in every state shall 
be bound thereby,” indicating a foundational commitment to 
international credibility and to international law.
Any treaty may conceivably conflict with federal statute. 
Because treaties are part of the “supreme Law of the Land,” 
conflicts are resolved in the same manner as between two 
federal statutes. Courts attem pt to interpret the words of
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conflicting federal statutes in such a manner that they are 
consistent. However, if a contradiction is so profound that it 
cannot be resolved, the courts will generally conclude that the 
more recent of the two laws was intended implicitly to amend 
the earlier.
Thus, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could conflict 
with federal laws on, for example, health , safety or 
environm ental compliance (Tanzman and Haffenden III-29), 
which have extensive requirements for perm its and the 
following of specific procedures. Because any inspection on U.S. 
territory must be in compliance with all applicable laws, this 
could become a fertile field for judicial action were the 
inspecting entity zealous in proceeding with an inspection 
without the necessary permits and legally required procedures. 
The U nited S tates’ interests are best served by EMND’s 
identifying the safety and other regulatory limitations which 
apply and developing plans for dealing with them in the event 
of a challenge inspection in U.S. territory.
National Rights
A sovereign nation may be defined as a political entity 
which maintains order and protection against lawlessness 
within its own borders. At present, most nations do not 
recognize any political entity higher than or of greater
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authority than themselves, or if such a recognition exists, it is 
very limited. Nations maintain relations among themselves by 
means of diplomacy and treaties. Sovereignty encompasses the 
principle that a sovereign nation need not, and in most cases 
will not, permit foreign entities to conduct operations within its 
borders.
However, there arise in the international arena situations 
w herein nations have surrendered a portion of their 
sovereignty to achieve some perceived desirable goal or for the 
common good. Such a situation prevailed in 1961 when the 
Antarctic Treaty was negotiated. There then existed a 
perception that a system of m ultilateral inspections would 
effectively demilitarize the Antarctic continent and that such a 
demilitarization would be beneficial to all parties. A number of 
inspections have been executed, and no violations of the 
Antarctic Treaty have ever been discovered (U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency).
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) is another example 
wherein two nations, the U.S. and the then-U.S.S.R., perceived 
that a regime of bilateral inspections would serve the mutual 
interests. Each nation agreed to permit the other to perform 
limited inspections of its own nuclear weapons test program. 
Thus, each nation gave up a measure of its sovereignty for the 
common good. This attitude of mutual cooperation for the 
common interest reflects the Augustinian position regarding
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laws. “Human codes of conduct vary according to . . . custom,” 
he writes in C onfessions 3:8, otherwise, “the common interest 
would suffer.”
In the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
inspection scheme is significantly more intrusive, thereby 
im posing more im m ediately upon the sovereignty o f the 
signatory States Parties. This may be perceived by some 
parties as excessive. However, Edward Lacey (1992) has
pointed out that
Verification of com pliance with the obligations
imposed by an arms lim itation and disarmament
agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to 
an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or 
by an organization at the request and with the 
explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression 
of the sovereign right of States to enter into such 
agreem ents.
Thus participation in the regime created by the CTBT is 
entirely voluntary, to be entered into only by States Parties
which perceive that some benefit thereby accrues to them and 
to the international system as a whole. Because there is a 
seemingly universal desire to ban nuclear weapons testing and 
an equally strong perception that the CTBT would be effective 
to that end, the new regime is viewed positively by the officials 
of many nations.
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Individual Rights
Within the U.S. Department of Energy, concern has been 
expressed regarding the Constitutional rights of U.S. workers 
who m ight be interviewed during an inspection under the 
CTBT. This concern centers on the Fifth Amendment rights of 
U.S. citizens against self-incrim ination. Potentially an 
“interview” by a supranational Organization would contravene 
the workers’ Constitutional rights.
This is a very serious concern. However, the draft Treaty 
and Protocol dated 10 April 1995 partially addressed this 
concern. The draft Protocol, Part 5, Paragraph 39.3 states that
The inspected State Party shall be under the 
obligation to allow the greatest degree of access, 
taking into account any constitutional obligations it 
may have with regard to proprietary rights or 
searches and seizures.
It is not clear that this provision adequately addresses the 
immediate concern. In the United States, detailed resolution of 
this critical and sensitive issue will likely be completed in the 
courts.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must comply with 
the Constitution in every respect. After a treaty is ratified, it 
becomes the “Law of the Land.” However, to the extent that a 
treaty violates Constitutional rights, the treaty cannot be
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enforced on U.S. territory. A challenge inspection on U.S. 
territory could be proposed for federal property, state lands or 
private property.
In the case of a challenge inspection proposed for private 
property, the Fourth Amendment rights of the property owner 
would become a major issue. If the owner is a natural person, 
such as a farmer, the U.S. government could exercise eminent 
domain. That, however, requires time-consuming due process 
whereas the CTBT envisions a rapid on-site inspection.
If the owner is a corporation, such as a mining company 
whose underground workings are suspected by the inspecting 
entity of having hosted a weapons test, the situation becomes 
more complicated. A warrant would of course be necessary. 
However, to perform a seismic investigation or a drillback 
operation at a working mine, it might become necessary to shut 
down operations of the mine. This would cause most of the 
mine workforce to be laid off for a lengthy time, resulting in 
hardship to workers and families, adverse impacts to the local 
community, and cessation of tax revenue to the state in which 
the mine is located. These issues of Constitutional rights should 
be addressed and planned for before ratification of the treaty.
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Intrusions Affecting National Security
Within the U.S. Department of Energy, concern has also 
been expressed  regarding national security  under an 
inspection. At the Nevada Test Site, for example, an 
excessively zealous inspection team may seek to observe 
facilities and equipment which do not relate to the CTBT but 
which are a sensitive national security concern.
The draft Treaty and Protocol dated 10 April 1995 seems 
somewhat weaker in this regard than U.S. officials might 
prefer. The Protocol, Part 5, Paragraph 39.3, provides that
The inspected State Party has the right under 
managed access to take such measures as are 
necessary to protect the national security.
This provision seems to contain a potential difficulty 
regarding security interests. One naturally wonders if 
“managed access” is the only m easure deem ed to be 
“necessary” to protect U.S. security interests, or if other 
measures would be acceptable under the CTBT.
Of specific concern is the issue of overflights. An 
overflight of the Nevada Test Site as part of a challenge 
inspection could reveal classified information from areas not 
under immediate suspicion of nuclear weapons testing. A 
second issue of concern is that of excessively intrusive general
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inspections conducted under authority of combined treaties. 
The Nevada Test Site, and probably other sensitive U.S. 
facilities, could experience a symbiotic vulnerability resulting 
from such multiple-treaty inspections. Information gained in 
this manner could compromise national security.
Safety
Safety of U.S. workers affected by the CTBT is an 
important legal issue. In the United States, worker safety, 
particularly as regards radiation safety, has been a critical 
issue for decades. Some other nations do not have nearly as 
great a regard for workers’ well-being. The issue then arises 
concerning what safety standards the Organization should use. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, 
doubtless has safety standards, but they do not pertain to 
safety of inspectors investigating a potential nuclear weapons 
test site. It is not clear, as of this date, what safety standards 
would prevail in the Organization, how they would be applied 
in a deployment, and how the standards might affect inspection 
effectiveness. An additional area of uncertainty is that of legal 
liability for injuries experienced by a U.S. citizen while on an 
inspection, or by a foreign inspector injured at a U.S. site.
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UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO A CTBT BY 1996 
Historical Development
The United States has a long history of commitment to 
and support for international control of nuclear weapons and 
for a concomitant ban on testing. In March 1946, only eight 
months after the first nuclear weapons were used in combat, 
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was released (Rhodes 765). That 
report envisioned the creation of an international authority to 
control nuclear weapons and to control the materials used to 
make them. In a consultancy report, Timothy J. Pounds shows 
that the hypothetical authority then envisioned would conduct 
extensive and highly intrusive on-site inspections to enforce a 
control regime. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report thus reflects the 
United States’ concern for arms control early in the nuclear era.
Based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the U.S. proposed 
in June 1946 the Baruch Plan which intended to establish 
international control over all nuclear activity (Moynihan 113). 
The Plan would have obligated all nations to surrender all 
nuclear activities to an international agency and to accept 
unlimited inspections. This international agency would have 
reported violations to the U.N. Security Council for prescribed 
responses. The Soviet Union rejected this ambitious plan, 
thereby initiating an international competition to acquire ever
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more effective nuclear weapons in increasing numbers as 
Richard Smoke and Kosta Tsipis describe.
Timothy J. Pounds describes how development and 
surface testing of fission and fusion weapons proceeded. Public 
awareness and fallout levels increased, and the outlines of the 
nuclear weapons debate became apparent. In December 1954, 
a U.S. test in the Pacific exposed personnel to radiation. In 
another incident, rain containing radioactive material from a 
Soviet test fell on Japan. The public and experts began an open 
debate on whether to stop testing. Advocates of a test ban 
claimed that health risks and security risks resulting from a 
continuing arms race could not justify ongoing testing. Testing 
supporters argued that a test ban without credible verification 
provisions would be unfeasible and that continued testing was 
necessary to deter Soviet aggression.
Concern for a credible and dependable way to ban testing 
was apparent, and international concerns about testing 
continued. The governments of Japan and India called for 
inquiries concerning testing or temporary bans. The United 
Kingdom called for a U.S. — U.S.S.R. summit to suspend testing. 
Pope Pius XII expressed concern fo r the dangers of a 
continuing nuclear arms race and advocated disarmament. In 
1955, Secretary of State John F. Dulles responded to these 
sentiments when he stated that the U.S. could not then find a
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solution which would be “both dependable and in the interests 
of the United States.”
After numerous atmospheric tests and much public and 
internal debate, the United States, the Soviet Union and the 
United Kingdom began comprehensive test ban talks (CTB) in 
1958. A moratorium on testing was in effect from 1958 to 
1961, when the Soviet Union resumed atmospheric testing. In 
1961, while the talks were in progress, then-President John F. 
Kennedy visited the Nevada Test Site. He recognized the need 
for continued testing to establish weapons reliability and 
favored conducting the tests underground rather than in the 
atmosphere. He also favored retaining the skills of the nuclear 
scientists and established a nuclear rocket research program 
partially  for that purpose. After extensive negotiation, 
including a Soviet refusal to consider on-site inspections, the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) went into effect in 1963. The 
LTBT banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer 
space and under water. At President Kennedy’s insistence, 
underground tests were permitted, but the parties could not 
agree on a verification scheme. Verification remained the most 
important and complex issue concerning a test ban. The parties 
could not agree to a system of controls and inspections, and 
considered simple pledges to be dangerous to security and 
therefore inadequate. The U.S. position continued to be that on­
site inspections would be required to make a test ban credible 
(Eimer and Drell; Lacey). As a closed society in the Cold War
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context, the Soviet Union resisted all such inspections except 
voluntary ones.
In 1970, the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force. 
In early 1974, the Soviet Union proposed a threshold test ban 
wherein nuclear weapons tests would have been limited in 
yield. Later that year, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a 
bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). The new scheme 
departed from previous proposals by setting a yield ceiling of 
150 kilotons rather than a threshold measured in seismic 
magnitude. The TTBT also envisioned an end to all weapons 
testing as an ultimate international goal. A Protocol delineates 
geographic boundaries of test areas. The Protocol also provides 
for the exchange of technical data, for the exchange of geologic 
information on the test sites, and for the exchange of data from 
two calibration test shots at each site.
N egotiations fo r a complete test ban continued. 
Throughout the 1980’s, Congressional support for a test ban 
continued. In 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union began talks 
in Geneva on TTBT verification issues. The U.S. position was 
that further lim its on nuclear testing would not be in the 
national interest, but a precedent-setting on-site inspection 
regim e under the TTBT was eventually developed. A 
comprehensive test ban was viewed as a long-term objective.
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However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War have created a perception that, to some degree, 
this very condition now obtains, and that a comprehensive test 
’ ban is now attainable. By 1991, more than 60 nations had 
made statements supporting a near-term  comprehensive test 
ban. Most statements cited the end of the Cold War and the 
test ban’s link to stopping the arms race and to promoting 
nonproliferation. During the 1992 presidential election, both 
major political parties made a CTB part of their respective 
platforms (Leach, 1992; Hamilton, 1992).
Present Policv
The present U.S. policy is one of complete support for a 
com prehensive test ban (CTB) tha t includes extensive 
monitoring and verification provisions. During the 1992 
presidential campaign. Bill Clinton’s position was that a CTB 
would subserve American efforts to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear weapons to other countries. In 1993, during the 
Vancouver Summit, President Clinton reaffirmed his campaign 
pledge to obtain a CTB and announced the beginning of a 
consultative process with Russia, China and the United States’ 
allies aimed at starting CTB negotiations. In January 1994, 
negotiation for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began 
in Geneva.
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In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly of September 
27, 1993, quoted above. President Clinton articulated three 
guiding principles regarding U.S. nonproliferation policy. They 
are, first, nonproliferation is accorded highest priority and is 
integral in relations with all nations. Second, the U.S. will seek 
expanded trade and technology transfers to build international 
security. Third, the U.S. expects to build an international 
consensus to integrate nonproliferation and economic goals.
Several specific and relevant nonproliferation policies 
derive from these guiding principles. Primary among them is 
an activist approach which seeks to achieve compliance with 
nonproliferation goals by monitoring. In addition, the U.S. 
seeks an indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), and seeks to ensure that the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has resources for safeguards. The U.S. 
also seeks to strengthen and improve IAEA’s ability to detect 
undeclared nuclear facilities. The U.S. promotes regional 
nonproliferation initiatives, with special efforts in Korea, the 
Middle East, and the South Asian Pakistan-India area. (U.S. 
Department of Energy, undated).
Policy Impact on the U.S. Department of Energy
These national policies have im plications for the 
Department of Energy. As a nonproliferation norm, the DoE is
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to support IAEA’s ability to detect clandestine weapons 
developm ent activities. Information exchange to combat 
nuclear terrorism  and smuggling of fissionable nuclear 
weapons materials is also a high priority.
Present political considerations recognize a shift from a 
U.S.-Soviet bipolar emphasis to a nonproliferation policy more 
oriented toward regional considerations (U.S. Department of 
Energy). This emphasis includes use of DoE nuclear experts and 
DoE country-specific nonproliferation experts. DoE expects to 
apply expertise developed in the DoE weapons complex during 
the Cold War to regional problems. These efforts include treaty 
verification  and implementation, provision of technology 
expertise  during treaty nego tiations, systems analysis 
capability , and environmental m onitoring and remediation 
technology as applied to weapons test sites.
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CTBT
Many nations have sought a complete ban on the testing 
of nuclear weapons. Concerns about proliferation, the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, the recent experience with Iraqi nuclear 
weapons development, and Russian and U.S. moratoriums on 
testing have led to an international climate wherein an 
effective ban is perceived to be both politically possible and 
technically feasible. Times have fundamentally changed in this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 4
regard. Augustine writes in C o n fe s s io n s  3:7 that “it is the 
nature of time to change,” and that it is the place of humankind 
to “prescribe and apportion [laws and measures] according to 
the needs of the times.”
Although testing is not a strict technical necessity to 
develop nuclear weapons, the conference held in 1995 on the 
extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has heightened 
the perception of the need and appropriateness of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the NPT conference, 
central issues included continued nuclear testing by the 
declared nuclear weapons states, asymmetries between the 
nuclear and non-nuclear states, and multinational involvement 
in the monitoring and compliance evaluation process. Of 
particular interest has been the inability  of the current
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) inspection provisions to 
ensure detection and identification of clandestine efforts to 
develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Recent events in Iraq and 
in North Korea have dem onstrated that concerns about
proliferation and about effective counterproliferation measures 
are well founded. Thus the international community views the 
CTBT as an important and indispensable element in the
extension of the NPT.
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Background to the CTBT
Negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
began in Geneva in January 1994 under the auspices of the 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament. Sweden and
Australia each submitted their own versions of draft treaties. 
After discussion and negotiation, the participants produced a 
draft treaty on 10 April 1995. In Part 2, “Scope,” the draft 
CTBT provides that
Each [State Party] [of the Parties to this Treaty] 
undertakes [to prohibit, and to prevent, and] not to 
carry out, [at any place and] [in any environment,] 
any nuclear weapon test [explosion] [which
releases nuclear energy] [in any form or any type], 
or any [other] nuclear [test] [explosion], [and
undertakes to prohibit and prevent any such 
nuclear explosion] at any place [under [or beyond] 
its jurisdiction or control] [.] [:]
[(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including 
outer space; or under water, including territorial 
waters or high seas; or (b) underground.]
The peculiar style of this draft Treaty is known as a Rolling 
Text and is intended to convey all of the alternate wordings 
under consideration. This Draft is considerably stronger than
that of a previous Draft dated 05 September 1994, which 
contained the significant provision
[, with the exception of any explosions which may 
be authorized in exceptional circumstances] [.] [;]
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Thus the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as envisioned in the 
draft of 10 April 1995, is a “convention [intended to] establish 
. . .  the customary usage or the law of the community or the 
state,” regarding use of nuclear explosive devices, as Augustine 
writes in C o n fe ss io n s  3:8. Generally, each signatory to the 
Treaty would be prohibited from executing any nuclear 
weapon test explosion. This complete prohibition of all nuclear 
explosions, including peaceful explosions and research test 
explosions is to be the “customary usage.” By this Treaty, the 
signatory States Parties, acting for the human race, intend to 
ban nuclear weapons explosions. A major element of 
Augustinian just war theory is that human activities should 
have peace as a goal (Langan 174). This Treaty attempts to 
approach that goal.
New International Organization
To achieve the stated goal, the draft CTBT establishes an 
entity which it names as the Organization. The draft also 
establishes a Conference of States Parties and an Executive 
Secretariat, each with specific functions. It further establishes 
a Global M onitoring System whose purpose is to detect 
evidence of any nuclear explosion.
The O rganization  exists to conduct international 
monitoring and inspections. The Organization is also to provide
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a forum for consultation and cooperation among the signatory 
States Parties. The Organization is to consist of the Conference 
of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical 
Secretariat which is to include an International Data Center.
The Conference of the States Parties, composed of one 
representative of each signatory State Party, is the governing 
body of the Organization and makes recommendations and 
decisions on questions which any State Party or the Executive 
Council may raise. The Conference exists to review and to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. It also 
addresses measures to “redress and remedy any situation that 
contravenes the provisions of the Treaty.”
The Executive Council consists of representatives of those 
States Parties which were nuclear-weapons States Parties to 
the Nonproliferation Treaty, and other members which serve in 
rotation for two-year terms. Responsible to the Conference, the 
Executive Council resolves ambiguous events by means of 
information exchanges and by challenge on-site inspections. 
The Executive Council also receives and implements requests 
from States Parties for on-site inspections.
The Technical Secretariat assists the Conference and the 
Executive Council as the agency empowered to conduct 
inspections. It is that element of the CTBT regime which 
creates maximum cred ib ility  and which provides the
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imm ediate deterrent to a nation or group which would 
otherwise desire clandestinely to test a nuclear weapon. The 
T echnical Secretariat also nego tia tes  agreem ents and 
arrangements relating to monitoring and inspection activities. 
A major function of the Technical Secretariat is to operate the 
International Data Center as part of the Global Monitoring 
System .
The Global Monitoring System will conduct in a mutually 
com plim en tary  and supportive m an n er seism ological 
monitoring, monitoring of radionuclides in the atmosphere, 
hydroacoustic monitoring at sea and infrasound monitoring in 
the atmosphere (Conference on Disarmament, Evaluation). Data 
gathered is transmitted to the International Data Center. Under 
the CTBT, each States Party is to establish monitoring stations 
and to provide the data obtained to the International Data 
Center. Each State Party has the right to receive all data 
collected.
Seismological recordings have long been recognized as a 
primary means of detecting nuclear explosions. The capability 
to detect such an explosion depends on the number of 
recording stations and on their distribution. The seismic 
monitoring network must recognize a nuclear explosion from 
among thousands of seismic events annually, which include 
natural earthquakes and chemical explosions conducted during 
mining and excavation operations. To be most effective, the
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recordings from the global network must be transmitted 
rapidly to the International Data Center (IDG) and analyzed in a 
timely manner to be made available to the States Parties to the 
CTBT. The seismological recording scheme will need to reflect 
these facts. There are presently three different arrays of 
seismic recording devices under consideration. A maximum of 
150 recording stations would be deployed on land, at 
substantial cost. These would detect, locate, and identify 
seismic events, and would transmit the data, possibly by 
satellite links to the IDC (Conference on Disarmament, Seismic). 
For the most part, the seismic data would be made available for 
scientific purposes (Monastersky 391).
A nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, or venting from 
an underground nuclear explosion, releases radioactive 
particles and gases which are dispersed over a very wide area. 
Depending on the location of the test, the location of a 
monitoring station, and on meteorological factors, the time from 
detonation to detection of radionuclides can be a few hours to a 
few days. The scale of these time-dependent detections 
differentiates radionuclide monitoring from monitoring for 
shock or sound waves for which evidence of a test would 
accumulate within minutes or hours. However, radionuclide 
analysis is of fundamental importance because it is the only 
technique for the detection of radionuclides which result from 
nuclear fission. Detection of such radionuclides is very strong 
evidence that a nuclear detonation has occurred. Three options
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for a worldwide network of radionuclide monitoring stations 
are under consideration, with a maximum of about 100 stations 
envisioned (Conference on Disarmament, Options . . .
Radioactivity; Relevance).
A nuclear explosion in the oceanic environment creates 
marine sonic waves which can be detected and located by a 
suitably arranged network of detectors. In the case of a 
nuclear explosion which occurs near the surface of the sea, 
hydrophones can detect the event although land-based seismic 
detectors cannot do so. If the explosion is fully contained, the 
hydroacoustic method serves well in conjunction with seismic 
means. For shallow explosions, the hydroacoustic method is the 
only method which can locate the event. Three potential 
deployment scenarios are currently under consideration, which 
envision varying numbers o f hydrophones mounted in fixed 
bottom  arrays or on m oored buoys (C onference on 
Disarmament, Options . . . Hydroacoustic). None of the 
techniques envisioned are capable of detecting submerged 
submarines at sea, an important issue to States Parties that
prefer that their submarines remain undetected.
Infrasound m onitoring is an established method of 
detecting and locating nuclear explosions. By means of
microbarographs, the method detects sound waves in the 
atmosphere resulting from a nuclear explosion. M odern 
instrumentation can detect a nuclear explosion at distances
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greater than 1500 miles. Microbarographic stations can be co­
located with seismic stations in most instances. About 100 
m icrobarographic stations are envisioned (Conference on 
Disarmament, Infrasound).
Operations of the Organization
The CTBT authorizes the Organization to collect data, to 
deposit that data in the International Data Center, and to 
conduct on-site inspections in response to a challenge by one or 
more of the States Parties. Each State Party would have the 
right to analyze all data which the International Data Center 
may collect. If any State Party believes that a nuclear weapons 
test has occurred, that State Party has the right and the moral 
obligation to request an on-site inspection of the suspect site. 
The inspection would be conducted by persons designated as 
inspectors by the Technical Secretariat. The challenged State 
Party is obligated to permit the inspection and to assist in its 
execution. Nationals of the requesting State Party may 
participate in the inspection only as observers, according to the 
current draft version.
The Antarctic Treaty of 1961 is an example of an early 
arms lim itation effort and a precedent in nonproliferation 
inspections. By the Antarctic Treaty, all military activity, 
including nuclear tests, is banned in Antarctica. Each signatory
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has the right to inspect the Antarctic facilities of every other 
signatory nation. Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the Soviet 
Union and the United States have all exercised the right to 
inspect. The U.S. has conducted eight inspections, all of which 
involved Soviet facilities. No military activities, armaments or 
nuclear weapons activities have been observed, and all 
scientific programs were in accord with published plans (U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990). According to 
all reports, the activities observed complied with the provisions 
and the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. This experience provides 
a model of cooperation for the CTBT.
Staffing and Activities of Inspection Teams
The States Parties to the CTBT provide qualified 
inspectors to the Technical Secretariat which continuously 
maintains a cadre of inspectors. The inspectors would have 
diplom atic immunity when they are executing their duties 
within the territory or airspace of a challenged nation. The 
Technical Secretariat would likely be required to maintain 
equipment suitable to execute an inspection for all the sites at 
which an inspection is likely to be required. The equipment 
would therefore be required to function under extremes of 
temperature, humidity and altitude. The inspectors would 
likely maintain, calibrate and service the equipment.
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The inspectors are required to begin their inspection 
within seven days of the time that a States Party requests it. 
By the provisions of the CTBT draft of 10 April 1995, Protocol, 
Paragraph 39.5, the inspection is to include, as appropriate:
Topographic work and surveying 
Visual observations 
Photography and video imagery 
Sampling of gas, soil, and liquids 
Measurement of radionuclide activity 
Seismological surveys
Magnetic, gravitational and thermal measurements 
Drilling into the area of a suspected weapons test
These activities are deemed to be those most likely to 
determine if a nuclear weapons test has or has not taken place 
at a particular site. The envisioned inspections are significantly 
more involved than those which U.S. and Soviet inspectors have 
executed under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. They may also 
in principle take place at any location rather than only at 
established Soviet testing sites or the United States’ testing site.
The inspectors report their findings to the Technical 
Secretariat. If the Organization believes that an unauthorized 
nuclear weapons test has occurred, it reports that fact to the 
United Nations Security Council for appropriate action, 
including possible sanctions of various sorts, including military
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action. This provision reflects the Augustinian position set 
forth in C onfessions 3:8 that “no one . . . may, to suit his own 
pleasure, violate the conventions established by customary 
usage or the law of the community or the state.” Otherwise, 
“the common interest would suffer.”
Deterrence and Credibilitv
Parties inclined to test nuclear weapons must believe that 
their tests will likely be detected and that their activities will 
face in ternational publicity, with sign ifican t negative 
consequences. Such consequences would include international 
opprobrium . U nited Nations sanctions, and diplomatic 
responses by nearby and affected states. Military responses 
are also envisioned (Deutch 122). These are the consequences 
deemed most likely to deter clandestine testing of nuclear 
weapons.
Many scenarios are of course possible, but the most likely 
one regarding a challenge inspection involves first a challenge 
from one or more of the States Parties which suspect that a 
nuclear weapons test has taken place. The challenging States 
Parties would specify a suspect area, which would be reduced 
in size as additional information became available. According 
to the draft Treaty dated 10 April 1995 Protocol, Sec. 39.7 and 
Sec. 39.8, at a suitably delineated suspect site, the Organization 
would conduct visual observation, along with ground, airborne
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and submarine photography as appropriate. This initial 
observation could include spectral monitoring. The next 
activity would be taking samples of gas, soil and liquids from 
the site and measuring of radionuclide activity in the 
atmosphere and in the ground. Additional investigation
intended to establish the presence of a cavity or chimney 
resulting from a nuclear weapon test would likely follow. Such 
investigation could include seismological methods, ground 
penetrating radar, or other methods.
A drillback operation at the suspected test site is the 
activity which potential testers would view as most credible. 
The recovery of radioactive samples would provide conclusive 
evidence that a test had been conducted. Such a drillback 
operation would have the greatest deterrent effect against
clandestine testing. The Organization would require such a 
capability on a continuous basis.
Such a drillback is not without difficulties. Heretofore,
U.S. authorities have conducted drillbacks as part of their own 
testing scheme. However, a drillback conducted by the 
Organization within the territory of a sovereign nation raises 
novel issues.
Novel operational and logistical issues of interest to the 
D epartm ent of Energy include protection o f inspecting 
personnel from radiation resulting from a poorly executed test.
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disposal of potentially or actually radioactive cuttings, and 
liability for environm ental cleanup after the drillback is 
completed. In addition, issues arise concerning transportation 
and disposal of contaminated drill parts; and ownership, 
transportation, and disposal of a contaminated drill rig. Such 
issues would have to be addressed in the event of a drillback.
U.S. ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH THE CTBT 
On-Site Inspection Agency
On January 15, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed a 
Directive establishing the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) 
and authorizing it to implement the on-site inspection 
provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Elimination of 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty). OSIA was 
then chartered as a Department of Defense agency on January 
26, 1988.
Personnel from all military services, as well as civilian 
experts and support personnel, permanently staff OSIA. The 
agency maintains close liaison with Executive Branch agencies 
that are involved with the arms control and nonproliferation 
processes. Within OSIA, the Science Advisor is by Presidential 
Directive a senior Department of Energy offîcial with expertise
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in nuclear weapons testing. The Department of Energy 
provides other experts to OSIA in the conduct of its monitoring 
and inspection operations in the Soviet Union. The Inspection 
Operations Command performs the on-site inspections. The 
M onitoring  Operations C om m and provides continuous 
monitoring presence at former fissile materials production and 
assembly plants in Russia and the U.S.
On July 18, 1990, President George Bush signed a 
Directive which authorized OSIA to conduct inspections in the 
Soviet Union and to host Soviet inspections in the United States 
under the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). 
OSIA was thereby authorized to arrange for and to use DoE 
nuclear testing experts and other scientific experts in seismic 
yield monitoring and hydrodynam ic yield measurements of 
announced Soviet tests at Novaya Zemlya and at Semipalatinsk 
(W right, 1992). These functions are different from and 
significantly less extensive than those envisioned under the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
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Emergency Management and Nonproliferation 
Division. Nevada Operations Office. DOE
Description
The Em ergency M anagement and N onproliferation 
Division (EMND) is an element of DoE’s Nevada Operations Office 
(NV). Its primary mission is to provide generic treaty support 
to the Department of Energy, to the On-Site Inspection Agency, 
and to other interested elements of the U.S. Government. EMND 
functions under applicable laws and policies to implement 
some provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). 
A pplicable N ational Security Directives assign overall 
management of TTBT monitoring activities to the On-Site 
Inspection Agency (OSIA), an element of the Department of 
Defense. EMND supports OSIA by providing technical 
leadership and team members to conduct hydrodynamic yield 
measurements and other on-site inspection activities in Russia. 
EMND also serves to host Russian inspectors and visitors at the 
Nevada Test Site.
DoE established EMND in 1989 and provides guidance to 
EMND from the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security 
in Washington, D. C. This guidance is provided by means of 
funding allocations, written program guidance, and annual 
planning exercises. The EMND presently consists of about 30 
federal employees as well as contractor em ployees and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
scientists and other professional personnel in DoE’s National 
Laboratory complex. EMND functions under the supervision of 
a Director who reports to the Assistant Manager for Operations 
in DoE’s Nevada Operations Office. The Director’s staff consists 
of a Deputy Director, engineers, scientists and analysts, and 
secretarial support. These personnel are further divided into 
two teams, the Emergency Response and Remote Sensing Team 
and the Proliferation Response Team, each of which consist of 
about a dozen professionals who function under the direction of 
a team leader.
EMND integrates scientific, logistical and operational 
aspects of the DoE’s arms control and nonproliferation effort. It 
p rov ides expertise  in p ro jec t m anagem ent. P ro toco l 
in terpretation , electronic engineering, radiological health 
physics, mining engineering, data integration, photovideo 
interpretation and Russian language services. The Department 
of State has continuously relied on EMND for technical 
suggestions and assistance for a variety of missions involving 
Russian visits to U.S. nuclear weapons facilities. EMND’s 
technical and linguistic personnel provide training in Russian 
nuclear terminology and usage to members of the U.S. 
intelligence community. EMND also participates in security 
aspects of verification work. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rely on 
the expertise in EMND, its contractors and the National 
Laboratories on questions of policy relating to international 
nuclear weapons testing.
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The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and EMND coordinate 
closely in developing verification methodologies and technical 
applications supporting treaty compliance measures to be 
adopted by the U.S. EMND provides all of the required support 
for standard TTBT monitoring missions and cooperates with 
DNA to develop nonstandard TTBT verification techniques. 
EMND also cooperates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
to coordinate security measures for Russian nationals visiting 
the Nevada Test Site.
EMND coordinates with the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency to develop a deployable seismic verification system, 
and participates with the Center for Seismic Studies to consider 
developments in seismic technology.
Because the verification mission is technically complex, it 
requires close coordination between scientists, engineers, 
personages in the policy community, and political leaders. The 
three National Laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia; 
the U.S. Geological Survey; EG&G/Energy M easurement; 
Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.; and Raytheon 
Services Nevada have provided the necessary mix of technical 
professionals. EMND manages and coordinates these assets into 
integrated teams which perform the function of deployment 
missions. More than one hundred scientific professionals
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depend on EMND to gather information, plan, arrange training, 
and provide technical leadership and logistical support.
Present Capabilities
The present capabilities of the EMND relating to weapons 
testing treaties lie in the areas of support for Russian visits to 
U.S. nuclear weapons facilities and in the areas of technical 
support for the On-Site Inspection Agency regarding on-site 
inspection of Soviet nuclear weapons tests at Novaya Zemlya 
and at Semipalatinsk.
EW>fD supports discussions and negotiations of the 
coordinating group of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 
The Division conducts planning for Russian visits to U.S. nuclear 
weapons test facilities. In this capacity, the Division 
coordinates logistical and operational activities and arranges 
for housing of foreign inspectors and visitors and also prepares 
for the security and escort requirements.
The EMND has Russian language capability, including the 
capability to translate Russian documents relating to nuclear 
weapons technology. EMND has hosted foreign visitors from 
Russia, China, England, France and Yugoslavia. EMND gained 
significant experience with Russian visitors and Russian nuclear 
weapons technology during the Joint Verification Experiment of
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1988. A dditional ex p erien ce  resu lted  from the 
Nonproliferation Experiment, in which nearly a kiloton of 
chemical explosives was detonated at the Nevada Test Site.
In the conduct of on-site inspections at Russian nuclear 
weapons test sites, EMND supports the OSIA. The Division has 
thus gained expertise in planning and coordinating for 
inspections. EMND manages logistical support and research and 
development as required for inspections. The Division 
continues to provide Russian language capability for on-site 
inspections, and to provide members to the on-site inspection 
team .
NEW FUNCTIONS
The draft Treaty of 10 A pril 1995 authorizes some 
activities which are different from those in which EMND 
historically has been involved. There are five major 
differences. First, the Inspecting Organization would perform 
any inspection, rather than OSIA. Second, the inspection 
activities could be performed at any location worldwide, rather 
than only at declared nuclear weapons test sites. Third, 
inspections envisioned under the CTBT are more intrusive than 
those executed under the TTBT. Fourth, a CTBT inspection 
would be performed with a notification of a few days, rather 
than the months which are required under the TTBT. Fifth, the 
CTBT inspections are likely to be performed in an atmosphere
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of distrust if not outright hostility, although the United States 
desires an atmosphere of benign fairness.
The Draft Treaty of 10 April 1995, in the Protocol, 
Paragraph 39.5, makes provision for the following activities to 
be performed during an on-site inspection. These functions are 
described below.
Topographic Work
Topographic exam ination and mapping would be 
performed for the purposes set forth in the D raft Treaty, 
“determining the real coordinates of the inspection area and 
the coordinates of points where measurements shall be carried 
out in the area designated for inspection.” This activity would 
determine the location for further inspection activity.
Surveying would tie in measurement points, including 
points for geophones for geophysical measurements. Surveying 
w ould also establish  locations for seism om eters for 
microseismic examination of a suspected cavity or chimney. 
Leveling or use of tiltmeters would detect subsidence resulting 
from collapse of a cavity or chimney.
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Visual Observations
Visual observations would include attempts to detect a
cavity or chimney resulting from a weapons test. Also 
vulnerable to visual examination are surface drilling and 
emplacement equipment necessary to conduct an underground
test, as well as test cabling and surface structures dedicated to
acquisition of test data.
Visual observation would extend to standard geologic
mapping and sampling at a suspect site. In addition, non­
standard fracture mapping and search for artifacts from a 
suspected nuclear explosion would be included.
Photographv and Video Imagerv
Overflights and aerial photography would comprise an 
essential inspection capability of the Organization. The ability 
to rapidly prepare aerial photographs and maps by automated 
means and to compare them with previously existing data 
would be an important method for initial evaluation of nuclear 
test activity. Such a capability on the part of the Organization 
would carry credibility in the view of many. Thus the 
Organization would need to have the ability to prepare 
photographs of fissures, subsidence craters and buried cabling 
relating to weapons testing. An ability to conduct aerial
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magnetic and gravity surveys might reveal the presence of a 
cavity resulting from a weapons test. Aircraft mounted ground 
penetrating radar would provide a rapid estimate of subsurface 
conditions at a suspect site.
The Organization will require the capability to conduct 
over-ocean reconnaissance to address those situations in which 
a proliférant nation would execute a test in international 
waters. Aircraft with the capability to take photographs and 
perform real-time radiometric surveys would be necessary.
Sampling Gas. Soil and Liquid
Sampling and testing of soil for unusual heat flow and for 
presence of volatiles resulting from a nuclear explosion would 
also be conducted. These volatiles include radioactive noble 
gases and tritium, as well as stable gases such as €0%, CH  ^ and 
H%. Radioactive gases are most likely to be detected first. In 
absence of radiation, COj, CH  ^ and H; are indicative of a 
chemical high explosive detonation which could be detonated at 
shallow depth as a cover for a nuclear explosion at greater 
depth .
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Measurement of Radionuclide Activity
R adioactiv ity  from nuclear weapon debris can be 
detected and measured to provide evidence of clandestine 
nuclear weapons testing. The Draft Treaty envisions “radiation 
measurements in the atmosphere, on the ground surface, 
underground, underwater.” A “spectral gamma survey” from 
aircraft or submarines is also envisioned. These activities are 
necessary to detect the presence of radioactivity resulting from 
a nuclear explosion.
Seismological Surveys
Seism ological surveys would be necessary in many 
inspection scenarios. Most of these surveys use some source of 
energy input and they measure and interpret the seismic 
waves that result. These surveys have the potential to detect 
the presence of a cavity and chimney resulting from an 
underground nuclear test. Seismic surveys which do not use an 
input source can also detect and measure seismic signals 
resulting from the collapse of a cavity or chimney.
Magnetic. Gravitational and Thermal Measurements
Magnetic, gravitational and thermal measurements reveal 
other aspects of a nuclear test. An underground nuclear
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weapons test produces large quantities of ionized material, 
creates a large underground cavity, and emits heat into the 
surrounding media. Magnetic or electric prospecting of a 
suspect area may produce a signature indicative of a test. 
Gravitational surveying may disclose the presence of a cavity 
or chimney resulting from a weapons test. Therm al 
measurements may detect a thermal pulse resulting from a 
nuclear explosion.
Drillback Operations
The drillback operation is the activity of greatest 
credibility in the international environment. The ability of the 
Organization to conduct a drillback at any suspected site on a 
worldwide basis is the ultimate assurance of compliance with 
the CTBT. Carefully sited drilling at a ground zero location 
would be likely to detect a cavity, rubble zone or chimney. 
Samples of gas and rock core could be obtained, thereby 
increasing the credibility of the inspection process. In addition, 
in-hole geophysical techniques, sound measurements, and 
ground-penetrating radar techniques could also be performed. 
Down-hole radiation measurements would be an automatically 
envisioned activity. A drillback operation would entail a 
considerable logistics effort to move personnel, drill pipe, 
cement, mud, pumps and generators to the suspect site. A 
commercial drill crew cannot be expected to drill into a
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radioactive mass, so additional training would be required. 
Radiation monitoring would be continuous. Depending on the 
scenario, with sufficient training and prior preparation, such a 
drillback operation could be conducted in a few weeks with a 
high probability of success.
Environmental issues arise concerning the disposition of 
radioactive particles in the drilling mud and also concerning a 
method to reclaim the drill sites, as well as disposal of 
radioactive drill components. In all of these activities, EMND 
would have ability to provide technical expertise directly to the 
inspection effort or to train others to perform the necessary 
operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Under the CTBT, EMND’s functions would thus be 
significantly different from those presently exercised under the 
TTBT. Under the TTBT, EMND supported OSIA in inspections 
only in Russia or the United States. Under the CTBT, EMND must 
support U.S. interests wherever they relate to the new 
international Organization.
Concerns about proliferation and emphasis on the CTBT 
change the technical monitoring focus of the EMND. Heretofore, 
EMND’s effort was primarily yield estimation of declared tests
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at two declared sites in Russia. Hosting Russian inspectors at 
the NTS has been an important additional mission. Under the 
CTBT, EMND’s mission would include backstopping exercises, 
training, and support for a U.S. contribution to the Organization 
or to a deployment. Hosting inspectors in the United States 
would be a continuing mission.
Comparison of EMND’s present capabilities and the tasks 
that would be required of it under the CTBT show that 
additional capabilities will be required. Consideration of these 
necessities leads to the following recommendations.
Enhance Use of EMND within 
Nevada Operations Office
Because of valid delegations and long-standing expertise, 
the Emergency Management and Nonproliferation Division 
should remain in Nevada as a unit of the Nevada Operations 
Office. EMND can interact with DoE Headquarters units to 
provide expertise in the development of a workable CTBT, 
Protocol and implementation documents. The implementation 
documents are particularly important because they define the 
details of an on-site inspection. EMND is well-prepared to 
contribute in this function. In Nevada, the EMND would also be 
well situated to support implementation of CTBT provisions 
relating to establishment of the Organization and on-site
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inspection capabilities. A Nevada-based EMND would be best 
able to minimize intrusions and impact on U.S. activities at NTS 
and to support Operations Security functions. EMND is close to 
the relevant contractors and National Laboratories and is well 
situated to manage development of scientific systems for on­
site inspections.
Reconfigure EMND to Reflect New CTBT
Under DoE Headquarters guidance, EMND should be 
reconfigured to reflect the needs of the CTBT. EMND should 
acquire new capabilities as the CTBT progresses through the 
ratification process and as the Organization is established.
EMND should provide expertise for U.S. efforts to 
interpret data provided by the International Data Center. This 
implies that EMND should maintain existing capabilities in 
seismic technology and in detection of radionuclides. EMND 
should develop expertise in hydroacoustic monitoring and in 
infrasonic techniques.
EMND may support OSIA for inspections in the U.S. 
Under the new regime, EMND would support a U.S. contribution 
to a multinational inspection effort under the auspices of the 
Organization. This effort would include developing the
capability of performing a rapid on-site inspection at any
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suspect site. The possibility of performing multiple widely- 
separated inspections simultaneously is quite real, and EMND 
should be prepared to provide support in such a contingency. 
EMND should continue its ability to host foreign inspectors 
against the possibility of a challenge concerning an alleged U.S. 
test.
Assign to EMND the Conduct of CTBT Training 
for the International Inspectorate
The new international O rganization will require
competent and trained personnel to perform inspections. To 
maintain credibility, the Organization will necessarily maintain 
a fully deployable inspection capability at all times. To meet 
the intent of the CTBT, the Organization’s inspection team[s] will 
necessarily be multinational and the team must not be
composed of so many inspectors from one nation that the 
ability to inspect in that nation is thereby compromised. A
relatively large foreign cadre would be required in the
Organization, for example, if the U.S. were to be challenged.
During the period in which the Organization is forming, 
the EMND can be expected to provide a U.S. contribution to 
technical inspection capability for the Organization. EMND 
would train U.S. citizens and nationals of other States Parties to 
perform inspection duties. In the interest of both ethical and
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practical concerns regarding safety, EMND would have 
opportunity to inject the highest and most effective safety 
standards into the forming Organization.
Deploym ent
In any deployment of the Organization’s inspection team, 
EMND would have a major support role. To meet the 
deployment needs embodied in the new treaty, EMND should 
acquire new capabilities. In general the new capabilities 
enhance EMND’s support of a U.S. contribution and team 
members to the Inspectorate during a deployment intended to 
detect or verify clandestine testing, or to a practice 
deployment. In addition EMND would provide an observer for 
those inspections resulting from a U.S. challenge. EMND would 
be expected to learn from initial deployments and to rapidly 
incorporate new techniques and knowledge into future 
activities.
EMND should retain existing expertise and capabilities 
because they are necessary to the Department of Energy’s 
mission and relate not only to the requirements of the TTBT 
but also to the CTBT. Existing expertise and capabilities would 
enable EMND to function as a consultant, to support U.S. team 
members functioning on inspection teams, to provide personnel 
for inspection teams and to interpret data from monitoring and
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from inspections. EMND should continue a coordinating and 
managing function. Additional capabilities will be necessary 
when EMND supports a U.S. contribution to a deployment 
whose activities are those authorized by the CTBT. These new 
capabilities are set forth below.
Topographic Work
EMND should be prepared to contribute to topographic 
and surveying work at any location in the world. In addition, 
EMND should acquire surveying expertise sufficient to perform 
three-dimensional surveying in English or metric units at any 
location. EMND should therefore become familiar with the 
surveying coordinate systems of every nation judged likely to 
become an inspected party under the CTBT as well as the 
surveying system which the Technical Secretariat chooses to 
adopt.
Visual Observations
EMND should retain the observational expertise of its 
personnel in perform ing visual observations. These 
observational skills should include detection of evidence of 
nuclear weapons testing such as ground disturbance, presence 
of drilling equipment, presence of powerlines, presence of test
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cabling, distressed vegetation, and rockfalls resulting from 
seismic disturbance. Relevant personnel should become 
familiar with locations judged likely to become clandestine 
testing areas in the future. Geologic inspection abilities should 
also be retained. In addition, EMND should acquire ability to 
conduct most inspection activities underground. Therefore, the 
personnel should be trained in underground technology and 
safety.
Photography and Video Imagery
Regarding its functions of hosting an inspection in the 
U.S., EMND should maintain an ability in photography and 
imaging. This ability should include up-to-date video imaging 
as well as real-time data transmission by satellite. In 
addition, EMND should develop procedures to provide 
photographic services and imaging ability at any location in U.S. 
te rrito ry .
For support of an on-site inspection in foreign territory, 
EMND should develop imaging systems which are compatible 
with those of the Organization. EMND should thereby maintain 
capability to supply data to the Organization’s International 
Data Center.
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Sampling Gas, Soil and Liquid
EMND should acquire expertise in gas, soil, and liquid 
sampling theory and in statistical methods of analyzing and 
interpreting samples. EMND should acquire and maintain 
ability to perform sampling for evidence of bomb debris, noble 
gases and tritium and for 00%, CH^  and H;.
The TTBT included a restricted protocol, which strictly 
lim ited the sampling procedures which could be used and 
similarly limited the samples which could be obtained. The 
CTBT, as presently envisioned, contains no such limitations. 
This difference opens significant possibilities for extensive 
overt sampling and also for covert sampling. EMND should 
acquire and maintain expertise to interpret sampling results 
from the International Data Center. This expertise should be 
sufficient, insofar as the state of the art permits, to locate a 
puddle resulting from an underground nuclear weapons test. 
Such a capability, along with existing capabilities in drillback 
operations, would likely prove useful in on-site inspections in 
foreign nations. This capability would also enable EMND to 
control sampling at NTS and to interpret sampling techniques 
used during an on-site inspection on U.S. territory.
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Measurement of Radionuclide Activity
The CTBT authorizes radiometric activity to be performed 
in holes as much as 20 meters deep. EMND should therefore 
retain the expertise and ability to perform down-hole radiation 
measurements, as well as measurements of radioactivity in the 
atmosphere, soil and rock in the vicinity of a suspected site.
Seismological Surveys
EMND should maintain existing seismological surveying 
capability developed in response to the TTBT. In addition, 
EMND should retain expertise in ground penetrating radar and 
in-hole geophysical techniques as applied to the CTBT.
Magnetic, Gravitational and Thermal Measurements
To remain cognizant of the Organization’s authorized 
abilities, EMND should acquire expertise in m agnetic, 
gravitational and thermal measurements. This could take the 
form of contracts with academic institutions as well as 
commercial businesses and the National Laboratories.
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Drillbacks
As developed above, d rillbacks have the greatest 
credibility of all of the Organization’s inspection techniques. 
EMND should therefore accord the drillback activity requisite 
resources and capabilities. Further, EMND should make plans 
to support a U.S. contribution to a drillback inspection on a 
worldwide basis. This is a very considerable task, but it would 
generate the greatest credibility which the CTBT can make in 
preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The drillback scenario envisioned to be performed by the 
Organization differs significantly from drillbacks performed at 
the Nevada Test Site or from verification drilling performed 
under the TTBT. CTBT drillback operations could be performed 
at any location in a very rapid manner, and they would be 
intended to verify that a test has taken place rather than to 
measure the yield of an announced test. Any of the 
Organization’s drillbacks could produce radioactive cuttings 
which would have to be handled with regard to safety and 
would have to be treated and disposed in a responsible 
m anner.
In addition, there arises the issue of environmental 
restoration of a drillback operation. There is no present 
provision in the CTBT for this activity, but it is nevertheless a
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vitally important issue. EMND should be a prominent leader in 
this area.
Discussion
The new international initiative for banning nuclear
explosions results from a changing international political 
climate and creates new challenges for EMND. The challenge is 
to reorganize, under DoE Headquarters guidance, to support
treaty negotiations, to support a U.S. contribution to the
Organization and to be prepared for a potential challenge 
inspection on U.S. territory.
Under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, EMND supported 
the On-Site Inspection Agency in deployments to Novaya 
Zemlya and Semipalatinsk to determine the yield of Soviet 
nuclear weapons tests by seismic methods or by CORRTEX. 
Under the CTBT, the EMND could be expected to support 
inspections at any site worldwide.
EMND should acquire signiHcant new capabilities to meet 
the expanded requirements of the new treaty. These 
capabilities are intended to enable EMND to provide logistical 
and operational support to a U.S. contribution to the operations 
of the Organization. They include capabilities in global
positioning and surveying, underground examination, state-of- 
the-art imagery, sampling, down-hole radiation measurements.
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ground penetrating radar and in-hole geophysical, magnetic, 
gravitational and thermal measurements, and a drillback at 
any location. These new capabilities would enable the EMND to 
make a significant contribution to the advancement of nuclear 
nonproliferation.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
In the short term, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
will probably be effective to some degree in preventing or 
retarding proliferation of nuclear weapons, in that it supports 
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Many States Parties can be 
expected to adhere to the provisions of the developing 
nonproliferation scheme. The monitoring scheme gives every 
evidence of credibility and many potentially proliférant parties 
WÜ1 certainly weigh the costs of having to face sanctions from 
the United Nations Security Council in response to a nuclear 
weapons test. However, the first nuclear weapon used in war, 
a gun-device using uranium as the fissile material, was not 
tested prior to use. The authorities had every reason to expect 
that the device would work, given then-available scientific 
knowledge. Modern design procedures are very much 
advanced over those available in 1945. For example, many 
low-cost desktop computers have much more capability than 
those formerly available only in National Laboratories. Testing 
is therefore not necessary in the construction and use of a
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
nuclear weapon; to that degree, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty is of no effect in preventing proliferation.
Considering a longer-term perspective, a frightening 
prospect emerges from an Augustinian assessment of human 
nature and motivations acting in a Structural Realistic system 
of nations as described by Waltz and summarized herein. The 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty intends to create inducements 
for potential proliférant parties to refrain from proliferating. 
These inducements are public exposure of nuclear weapons 
testing activities, and potential responses by the United Nations 
Security Council, including economic sanctions and military 
action. In Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Deborah Stone 
provides a relevant treatment of inducements. Stone’s model 
assumes that, first, the target of inducement has control of its 
own behavior. When confronted with knowledge of a penalty 
or a reward, the model assumes, the target can adapt to the 
new circumstances by means of changing its behavior. Second, 
Stone’s model assumes that the target of inducement is a 
unitary actor. “This means,’’ she writes, “not that the actor is 
necessarily an individual, but that it is an entity capable of 
rational behavior" (212). This assumption is similar to that of 
Morgenthau and other Realistic political scientists who claim 
that, in international affairs, political actors behave more 
rationally than in other arenas. Third, Stone’s model assumes 
that the target “has some orientation toward the future.’’ 
Inducements are effective, she writes.
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only to the extent that the target cares about the 
costs or rewards to be faced in the future and is 
willing to modify current behavior in order to 
shape future results. (215)
Stone provides a critique of these assumptions. There are 
situations wherein the designers of the sanctions have made 
them so drastic that the sanction givers are them selves 
reluctant to impose them. Inducements and sanctions lose
their credibility in such a situation. Evasion of sanctions is
common. Furthermore, she notes,
new inducements simply jo in  a broad array of
consequences the target already faces. The 
designer tends to focus on only the inducements he 
. . . designs. But for the target, new inducements 
always fit into a web of reinforcing and crosscutting 
consequences. (223)
In the in te rn a tio n a l env ironm ent re la tin g  to
nonproliferation. Stone’s three criteria are questionable and her 
critiques are telling. First, a proliférant party may not have 
control of its own actions. A nation may have fallen under the 
control of a small group of fanatics who pursue policies at 
variance with that ordinarily expected. This development is to 
be expected on occasion, given Augustine’s observation in 
C onfessions 10:36 that some persons “desire to be feared . . . 
simply for the pleasure that it gives.’’ Fearful examples
abound. Second, many national actors do indeed approach
their affairs in a more or less rational manner, but there is no
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guarantee that they would invariably do so. In an Augustinian 
analysis, it would be expected that on occasion they would not 
behave rationally. In Against F a u s tu s  22:74, Augustine 
describes “the desire to do harm, cruel vengence, a disposition 
that remains unappeased and implacable, a savage spirit of 
rebellion, a lust for domination.” This is the ultimate reflection 
of irrationality. Third, future orientation is common amongst 
national actors, but that is not always so. Stone’s critique is 
devastating to the notion that inducements and sanctions could 
be ultimately successful in invariably deterring proliferation. 
The Security Council has often declined to take military action 
or to impose sanctions upon parties who richly deserve it. 
Purposeful proliférants can be expected to evade the provisions
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Finally, it could be
expected, given an Augustinian pessimistic view of human 
nature, that a proliférant may not care about sanctions 
resulting from a nuclear weapons test. Such a party would 
proliferate and test, regardless of the consequences.
From these considerations, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty may be expected to have little effect on the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups or by nations
determined to have them at whatever cost in time, money and 
effort. Fred Charles Ikle, in a Foreign A ffairs article entitled 
“The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” agrees. “Technologies 
for these weapons,” he writes, “ [has begun] to escape
meaningful international controls” (126). There is “little
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insurance against human folly” (125). Therefore, proliferation 
by ideology-driven actors in the Middle East will not be halted 
or even affected very much. Proliferation can be expected in 
the Far East, including Japan, in response to Chinese weapons 
development, testing, and American disengagement from East 
Asia. Kongdan Oh describes a significant potential for 
“proliferation in Japan and South Korea” (166) which may 
result from this situation. In that regard, the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty contributes to a false sense of security.
The United States has made a decision to maintain an 
inventory of about 3500 nuclear weapons, a goal to be 
achieved by the turn of the century. (National Academy of 
Sciences 39). In a dangerous world, that is the only proper 
policy for prudent national leaders to pursue. Given that 
decision, complete cessation of nuclear weapons testing is not 
in the national interest of the United States or of any other 
declared nuclear wespons state. The Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty can only hinder the further development and testing of 
the U.S. arsenal and therefore must result in an arsenal of 
reduced effectiveness, reliab ility  and safety, com puter 
simulations and non-fissile testing notwithstanding.
Any nuclear explosive device spontaneously degrades 
over time and has a finite shelf life. As one example of the 
problem s encountered, the high-explosive component of 
implosion-initiated nuclear explosive devices exudes a vapor
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which condenses on the weapon’s other components, thereby 
degrading overall perform ance. Weapons in the active 
stockpile must be periodically removed for maintenance and 
refabrication. Testing has heretofore been necessary to ensure 
that weapons may be relied upon to function properly. A 
complete test ban renders maintenance and reliability issues 
problem atic.
Persons competent in the design and construction of 
nuclear weapons have a tendency to enter other challenging 
fields of work if their skills are not kept current. They thus 
take their expertise with them, and may not be in a position to 
make that expertise available in case of a future unspeciHed 
need. Jonathan Weisman has pointed out that, in the United 
States’ nuclear weapons laboratories, scientists are continually 
seeking other challenges. This attitude leads to many of the 
scientists seeking em ploym ent elsewhere in the present 
moratorium on testing (16). If testing indeed is to be 
permanently banned, sufficient outlets for these persons’ 
creative talents should be provided and their skills thereby 
retained .
The U. S. Department of Energy is required to certify that 
every weapon it produces will work as designed. The question 
naturally arises as to how to certify weapons in inventory 
under conditions of a test ban. In the United States, the 
current opinion is that weapons can be certified in the short
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term, using computer simulations, zero-yield experiments, and 
reliance on data from previous tests. However, in an undefined 
long term, there is no proven precedent other than that of 
testing to establish certifiability.
In The Citv of God 14:13, Augustine reminds us that
our first parents fell into open disobedience 
because already they were secretly corrupted; for 
the evil act had never been done had not an evil 
will preceeded it. And what is the origin of our evil 
will but pride? And what is pride but the craving 
for undue exaltation. And this undue exaltation 
becomes a kind of end to itself.
Each generation passes such a will to the next. The result, in
The City of God 14:15, is that “our flesh . . . now torments us by
insubordination.” Continuing in The City of God 15:4, Augustine 
describes the human society which necessarily follows. It is
often divided against itself by litigations, wars, 
quarrels, and such victories as are either life- 
destroying or short-lived. For each part of [society] 
that arms itself against another part of it seeks to 
triumph over the nations though itself in bondage
to vice. Peace is purchased by toilsome war
Humankind has already fought one nuclear war. Were 
Augustine the Realist alive today, he would point out that, 
given the precedents and despite all efforts to the contrary, in 
a sufficiently desperate situation, nuclear weapons will be used 
again.
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UST OF ACRONYMS
CORRTEX
CTBT
DNA
DoE or DOE
EMND
IAEA
INF
IDC
LTBT
NV or NVO
A method o f determining the yield o f a 
nuclear weapon by means of analysis of 
seismic waves generated by the explosion
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a pending 
treaty which would ban all nuclear explosions 
conducted by the signatory nations
Defense Nuclear Agency
United States Department of Energy, a 
cabinet-level agency chajiged with assembly 
and testing of nuclear weapons
Emergency Management and Nonproliferation 
Division, Nevada Operations Office, U. S. 
Department of Energy
International Atomic Energy Agency
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
International Data Center
Limited Test Ban Treaty, a treaty by which 
the United States and the former Soviet Union 
agreed to conduct nuclear weapons test 
underground, not in the atmosphere, space or 
oceans
Nevada Operations Office, U. S. Department of 
Energy, located in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Responsible for operations on the Nevada Test 
Site
127
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NPT Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty by which 
nations agree to refrain from developing 
nuclear weapons. Originally signed in 1970, 
renewed in 1995.
NTS
OSIA
TTBT
Nevada Test Site, a tract of land of more than 
1200 square miles in southern Nevada 
devoted to nuclear weapons testing, and to 
other national security activities
On-Site Inspection Agency, the entity of the U. 
S. Department of Defense which conducts 
nuclear weapons test site inspections under 
the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban 
T reaty
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, a treaty between 
the United States and the former Soviet Union 
which limited nuclear weapons tests to 150 
kilotons yield, and which provided for 
b ilateral inspections of nuclear weapons 
testing sites
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